



ABSTRACT. Conventional wisdom states that recent U.S. authorization of coercive
interrogation techniques, and the legal decisions that sanctioned them, constitute a dramatic
break with the past. This is false. U.S. interrogation policy well prior to 9/11 has allowed a great
deal more flexibility than the high-minded legal prohibitions of coercive tactics would suggest:
all interrogation methods allegedly authorized since 9/11, with the possible exception of
waterboarding, have been authorized before. The conventional wisdom thus elides an intrinsic
characteristic of all former and current laws on interrogation: they are vague and contestable,
and thus, when context so demands, manipulable.
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INTRODUCTION
The acquisition of information through interrogation traditionally has been
a central component of military and intelligence operations.' The need to
extract actionable intelligence has, if anything, become more salient since
September 11, 2001. A dispersed and "different kind" of enemy with no flag or
uniform, an inadequate understanding of this new foe's organization and
operations, and pressure to disrupt future surprise attacks have made
interrogation fundamental to the War on Terror.2
Unlike ordinary police interrogation, interrogation undertaken to acquire
intelligence information is not designed primarily to elicit admissions or
information that may be used in a conventional prosecution. As noted by
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) interrogation manuals, "Admissions of
complicity are not ... ends in themselves but merely preludes to the
acquisition of more information."' The interrogation goal, as reflected in U.S.
Army interrogation manuals, is to "obtain the maximum amount of usable
information.... in a lawful manner, in a minimum amount of time."'4 This
simply stated objective expresses well the tension inherent to interrogation
between obtaining timely intelligence and observing the legal constraints that
are understood to apply.
In 2002, the Bush Administration approved the CIA's use of certain
coercive interrogation techniques, reportedly including temperature extremes,
shackling, stress positions, sleep and sensory deprivation, loud noises, bright
lights, nudity, isolation, shaking, head and stomach slaps, and
waterboarding -a technique designed to simulate the sensation of drowning.'
1. See A.J. BARKER, PRISONERS OF WAR 59 (1975).
2. See THE INDEP. PANEL To REvIEw DoD DET. OPERATIONS, FINAL REPORT OF THE
INDEPENDENT PANEL To REVIEw DoD DETENTION OPERATIONS 63-64 (2004), reprinted in
THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 938-39 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L.
Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter THE TORTURE PAPERS], available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug20o4/ d2oo4o824finalreport.pdf.
3. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, KUBARK COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION 5 (1963)
[hereinafter CIA, KUBARK], available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB 122/CIA%2oKubark%2o 1-6o.pdf.
4. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND INTERROGATION HANDBOOK: THE
OFFICIAL GUIDE ON PRISONER INTERROGATION 8 (2005).
5. See Scott Shane, Book Reveals Red Cross Report on C.IA. Torture of Qaeda Prisoners, N.Y.
TIMES, July 11, 2008, at A9; Scott Shane, Inside the Interrogation of a 9/11 Mastermind, N.Y.
TIMES, June 22, 2008, at Ai [hereinafter Shane, Interrogation]; Scott Shane, David Johnston
& James Risen, Secret U.S. Endorsement of Severe Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2007, at




The CIA was not alone in its use of coercive interrogation. A Department of
Defense (DoD) "Special Interrogation Plan" authorized eighteen to twenty
hours of questioning per day for forty-eight out of fifty-four days, removal of
clothing, and exposure to dogs, cold, strobe lights, and loud music.'
The use of such pressure techniques and the various legal and policy
decisions that authorized them have been variously described as "uncharted,"7
"long condemned, " "new and aggressive,,"' and as a fundamental
transformation constituting a "New Paradigm."" The New York Times
reported that "[f]or decades before 2002, the United States had considered
several of the methods [ultimately approved for use by the CIA] to be illegal
torture."'1 One author, whose works prompted both the Senate and House
Judiciary Committees to hold hearings, claimed that the "U.S. military's
long-established constraints on cruelty and torture, dating back to President
Lincoln in 1863, were ... circumvented"12 and "discarded,"13 and that the newly
authorized interrogation program "turned its back on this tradition." 4 Some
take a different approach in characterizing the Bush Administration's legal
framework, but these voices also assume a dramatic break with the past-a
Mayer Reveals How Government Torture Programs Come To Be, SLATE, Aug. 6, 2007,
http://www.slate.com/id/2171773.
6. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., ARMY REGULATION 15-6: FINAL REPORT: INvESTIGATION INTO FBI
ALLEGATIONS OF DETAINEE ABUSE AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA DETENTION FACILITY 13-18
(2005) [hereinafter SCHMIDT REPORT] (containing the report of Lieutenant General Randall
M. Schmidt, U.S. Southern Command Air Forces Commander, who was the senior
investigating officer); Memorandum from William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, on Counter-
Resistance Techniques to Sec'y of Def. (Nov. 27, 2002) [hereinafter Haynes Counter-
Resistance Memo], in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 2, at 236; Memorandum from
Jerald Phifer, LTC, U.S. Army, Dir. J2, on Request for Approval of Counter-Resistance
Strategies to Commander, Joint Task Force 170 (Oct. 11, 2002) [hereinafter Phifer Memo],
in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 2, at 227, 227-28; Memorandum from Donald
Rumsfeld, Sec'y of Def., on Counter-Resistance Techniques in the War on Terrorism to the
Commander, U.S. S. Command (Apr. 16, 2003), in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 2, at
36o, 36o-65.
7. Shane et al., Secret, supra note 5.
8. Shane, Interrogation, supra note 5.
9. PHILIPPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM: RUMSFELD'S MEMO AND THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN
VALUES 2 (2008).
io. Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America's "Extraordinaty Rendition"
Program, NEw YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 1o6, 107.
ii. Scott Shane, Documents Laid Out Interrogation Procedures, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2008, at A19.
12. SANDS, supra note 9, at 22-23.
13. Id. at 2.
14. Philippe Sands, The Green Light, VANITY FAIR, May 20o8, at 218, 279.
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break justified by exigency. Former Attorney General John Ashcroft posed and
answered the question of interrogation policy change: "[W]e made it through
the Second World War with one set of rules and we made it through the Cold
War with another set of rules; shouldn't we just lock in on all those things and
pretend the world's the same? It's not.""s
A prominent public television series said that these methods are the
"harshest techniques ever authorized for use by American soldiers."' 6 The
Washington Post reports that the Department of Justice "rejected a decades-old
U.S. ban on the use of 'mind-altering substances' on prisoners."' 7 A New York
Times retrospective on the creation of the Bush Administration's interrogation
policy pronounced conclusively that "[n]ever in history had the United States
authorized such tactics."' 8 Policymakers, elected officials, legal scholars, and
opinion leaders have been no less certain in their pronouncements about
departures from legal tradition and unprecedented aggressiveness in the
interrogation context.' 9
The widespread assumption" that the Bush administration's interrogation
policies represent a dramatic repudiation of and stark departure from American
traditions is a central premise of both sides of the extensive and heated debate
15. From the Department ofJustice to Guantanamo Bay: Administration Lawyers and Administration
Interrogation Rules, Part V: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the judiciary, iloth Cong. (2008)
(on file with author) [hereinafter House Guantanamo Bay Hearing] (statement of John
Ashcroft, former Att'y Gen. of the United States).
16. Frontline: Bush's War (PBS television broadcast Mar. 24, 20o8), available at
http ://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/fronline/bushswar/.
17. Joby Warrick, Detainees Allege Being Drugged, Questioned: U.S. Denies Using Injections for
Coercion, WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 2008, atAi.
18. Shane et al., Secret, supra note 5.
ig. See, e.g., Coercive Interrogation Techniques: Do They Work, Are They Reliable and What Did the
FBI Know About Them?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, lioth Cong. (2008) (on
file with author) [hereinafter Coercive Interrogation Hearing] (statement of Sen. Richard
Durbin, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); id. (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein,
Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); id. (prepared statement of Sen. Russell D. Feingold,
Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 2, at xvii; David
Luban, Torture, American-Style: This Debate Comes Down to Words vs. Deeds, WASH. POST,
Nov. 27, 2005, at Bi; American Civil Liberties Union, Torture Is Wrong, Illegal and Un-
American, http://www.aclu.org/safefree/torture/index.html (last visited July 28, 2008).
20. One dissonant voice has argued that "CIA torture methods... have metastasized like an
undetected cancer inside the U.S. intelligence community over the past half century."
ALFRED W. MCCoY, A QUESTION OF TORTURE: CIA INTERROGATION, FROM THE COLD WAR
TO THE WAR ON TERROR 5 (2006). McCoy purports to document the history of CIA
involvement in interrogation. His book does not seek to determine, however, what methods
of coercive interrogation were officially authorized. Rather, it collects anecdotal examples of




about the justifiability, efficacy, and legality of coercive means of
interrogation.21 But as this Note will show, this widespread assumption is
simply wrong. There has been a remarkable continuity between interrogation
policies that prevailed after 9/11 and those employed in previous eras of
heightened security threats. For the fifty years prior to 9/11, the United States
consistently professed high ideals about its interrogation policies but at the
same time authorized aggressive interrogation policies when the security threat
seemed (to the President and intelligence and military officers) to warrant
them. Just as happened after 9/11, for decades before 9/11 CIA and military
officials crafted interrogation policies with a great deal more flexibility than the
high-minded legal prohibitions of coercive tactics appeared to many to permit.
In fact, as this Note will show, every interrogation method allegedly authorized
since 9/11, with the possible exception of waterboarding,2" was authorized at
times before 9/11 and was considered to be consistent with the reigning legal
framework. 3 Furthermore, and almost without exception, the techniques
approved after 9/11 for military interrogations of unlawful combatants would
21. Commentators often employ an unstated assumption that coercive interrogation post-9/l1
represents a departure from historical practice, approaching the problem as if it were a
totally new legal conundrum for the United States. See, e.g., PHILIP B. HEYMANN & JULIETTE
N. KAYYEM, PROTECTING LIBERTY IN AN AGE OF TERROR 1-2 (2005); Jeffrey F. Addicott, Into
the Star Chamber: Does the United States Engage in the Use of Torture or Similar Illegal Practices
in the War on Terror?, 92 Ky. L.J. 849, 863-64 (2004); Alan Dershowitz, Tortured Reasoning,
in TORTURE: A COLLECTION 257, 264-65 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004); Mary Ellen
O'Connell, Affirming the Ban on Harsh Interrogation, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1231, 1233-34 (2005);
Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Should Coercive Interrogation Be Legal?, 104 MICH. L. REV.
671, 672 (2006); Richard A. Posner, Torture, Terrorism, and Interrogation, in TORTURE: A
COLLECTION, supra, at 291; Joseph Lelyveld, Interrogating Ourselves, N.Y. TIMES, June 12,
2005 (Magazine), at 67.
22. That waterboarding may have never been authorized specifically does not indicate that it
was considered illegal. Darius Rejali told ABC News that a soldier who participated in
waterboarding in "January 1968 was court-martialed... and he was drummed out of the
Army." History of an Interrogation Technique: Water Boarding, ABC NEWS, Nov. 29, 2005,
http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/Investigation/story?id=1356870. Rejali says that the reference
to the court-martial is in Guenter Lewy's book America in Vietnam. E-mail from Darius
Rejali to author (Aug. i, 2008) (on file with author). This is true, though Lewy does not
indicate what the outcome of the court-martial was, much less whether the soldier was
"drummed out of the army," as Rejali claims. See GUENTER LEWY, AMERICA IN VIETNAM 329
(1978); see also Evan Wallach, Drop by Drop: Forgetting the History of Water Torture in U.S.
Courts, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 468, 472 (2007) (arguing that waterboarding has been
considered illegal when used in the past).
23. Formerly classified CIA publications discuss the use of sound waves and light. See Stanley B.
Farndon, The Interrogation of Defectors, STUD. INTELLIGENCE, Summer 196o, at 9, 27. This
author was unable to find an official directive authorizing the same; as such, these are
possible, although highly unlikely, exceptions.
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have been understood to fall within the legal constraints of the Geneva
Protections for protected prisoners of war at one point or another pre-9/11.
Several techniques (for example, sleep deprivation, and standing as a stress
position) that were understood at times before 9/11 as lawful by the military for
use on protected prisoners of war were more coercive by degree than the same
techniques authorized for use on unlawful combatants post-9/11. Other
techniques previously authorized (such as threats of violence) were considered
techniques of uncertain legality and specifically ruled out as too coercive after
9/11 for use by the military on unlawful combatants. With the possible
exception of waterboarding, the CIA techniques reportedly authorized post-
9/11-such as sleep and sensory deprivation, stress positions, and some direct
physical duress -had been authorized at points before 9/11 and understood to
fit within the then-relevant legal architecture.
In short, the post-9/11 approach to coercive interrogation, contrary to
conventional wisdom, is not new. And there are other aspects of the United
States's post-9/11 interrogation regime that have precursors dating to World
War II. First, both before and after 9/11, the institutions that promulgated
various interrogation policies questioned or resisted the use of some coercive
measures. They did so less as a reaction to evidence of inefficacy than because
of a combination of independent instrumental considerations concerning the
security threat as well as a sense of what constituted ethical or legally
permissible behavior. Both before and after 9/11 these concerns led the
government to avoid certain types of coercive interrogation and to develop
novel yet highly coercive methods that appeared at the time more obviously
legal and palatable.
Second, both before and after 9/11, applicable proscriptive language in the
various legal instruments governing interrogation was opaque and open to
interpretational latitude. This meant that context became an important factor
in dictating the ultimate interpretations that guided policy. Even if the relevant
legal terms remained constant over the course of different conflicts and
periods, to assume an unchanging interpretation of the legal rules is to make
possible the erroneous conclusion that the law, prior to 9/11, had constricted
permissible interrogation methods in the same way regardless of place and
time. This quite clearly was not the case for U.S. interrogation policy, which
has varied greatly in response to context despite unchanging legal language.
Absolute bans on vaguely defined abuse have provided, and continue to
provide, great interpretative latitude. But the conventional wisdom-assuming
unprecedented change post-9/11 in what the legal rules were interpreted to




This is, at least in part, a consequence of the Bush Administration's flawed
and careless legal work' 4- such as the conclusion that the legal definition of
torture was limited only to pain "equivalent in intensity to the pain
accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of
bodily function, or even death," and the argument that the President's
Commander-in-Chief power allows him complete discretion to authorize
interrogation by torture despite a federal criminal statute to the contrary.2" This
type of legal reasoning has made it appear that for coercive interrogation to be
considered lawful, the existing legal regimes had to be eviscerated through an
unprecedentedly crabbed interpretation and outrageous assertions of executive
prerogative to ignore the law. This, again, is false. Such extreme legal claims
have tended to conceal an intrinsic characteristic of all former and present laws
on interrogation: they are vague and contestable, and thus, when context so
demands, manipulable. And context so demanded well before September 11,
2001.
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses how, post-9/11,
government officials interpreted elastic legal instruments to allow techniques of
coercive interrogation that the CIA and military nevertheless resisted due to
concerns regarding morality, instrumentality, and retroactive discipline. Part II
considers how this very same dynamic characterizes interrogation law and
policy at points during the period 1949-1973, wherein the aforementioned
concerns led the government both to avoid certain types of coercive
interrogation and to design new and yet highly coercive techniques that
appeared then more obviously legal and morally justifiable. Part III continues
this inquiry for the period 1973-2001, and addresses how the simplest solution
to avoid the most difficult legal questions and explicit ethical qualms appears to
have been the near-total cession of interrogation responsibilities to
non-American personnel.
To be clear, this Note does not make a normative argument about how the
law should have been interpreted at any time nor about what the law should
be. It defends no particular interpretation, but only describes what reasonable
policymakers from both political parties have construed the law to allow at
various points in history. The scope of this Note, therefore, includes only what
has been authorized as consistent with the law; beyond its scope is any
discussion of whether or why interrogators at any time may have transgressed
24. See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY 148 (2007).
25. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., on Standards of Conduct for
Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §234o-234oA to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the
President (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Bybee Memo], in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 2,
at 172, 204.
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official policy through confusion as to what was authorized or for any other
reason. This Note seeks to upend the conventional wisdom about the novelty
of coercive interrogation methods so that a more informed debate can be had
about the difficulties of crafting interrogation policies to meet a severe threat.
All of the various legal instruments that bear on interrogation have been
interpreted not to proscribe the authorization of coercive tactics. This
astonishing continuity demands that we rethink how to construct interrogation
law and policy in wartime.
I. THE LAW'S LATITUDE: SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 TO THE PRESENT
The law governing interrogation underwent great change from 2001 to
2008. But one important characteristic of the law did not: all current legal
restrictions still provide the requisite latitude to make available the most
extreme interrogation measures reportedly approved post-9/11. In this key
respect, the character of the law remains unaltered. It remains ambiguous and
accommodating. It remains an essential continuation of the flexible legal
strictures, dating back to World War II, that predate current interrogation law.
The relationship between law and interrogation policy after September 11,
2001, mirrors previous practices in other respects as well. Confronted with
threats to national security, the institutional players responsible for
promulgating and executing interrogation policy were freed but also
confounded by law. Elastic legal regimes allowed the authorization of
techniques that ultimately both the CIA and military appeared to push back
against for both virtuous and instrumental reasons: a blend of institutional
resistance to "improper" or inappropriate practices and a fear of legal
repercussions.
On February 7, 2002, a directive from President George W. Bush
established that neither the prisoner of war (POW) protections of the Third
Geneva Convention26 nor the Conventions' Common Article 3-proscribing
"cruel treatment and torture" as well as "outrages upon personal dignity, in
particular humiliating and degrading treatment"' 7 - would apply to al Qaeda or
the Taliban. 8 The Geneva Conventions were determined not to apply to the
26. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T
3316, 75 U.N.T.S 135 [hereinafter Geneva III].
27. Id. art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138.
28. Memorandum from President George W. Bush on Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and
Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002) [hereinafter Bush Memo], in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra
note 2, at 134, 134-35.
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war against al Qaeda since, as the Justice Department advised, al Qaeda is not a
nation-state, is not a signatory to the treaties, and its members do not qualify
as legal combatants.29 Members of the Taliban were found" to be "unlawful
combatants" not meriting POW status since they did not meet the necessary
requirements of Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention which are to belong
to a hierarchical command structure, to bear a distinctive sign, to carry arms
openly, and to behave in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
31
Common Article 3 was considered inapplicable purportedly because the
"relevant conflicts are international in scope and Common Article 3 applies
only to 'armed conflict not of an international character.' 32 Though
international humanitarian law (the law of war) was thus understood
originally as largely inapplicable, the treatment of unlawful combatant
detainees held outside the United States was unavoidably still subject to
international human rights law which is operative at all times. It was within
this general legal context that the interrogation policies of the CIA and military
would develop.
A. Law and Interrogation: The Central Intelligence Agency
As in previous periods of insecurity, the 9/11 attacks established a fertile
environment for the adoption of more permissive policies. Sometime in 2002, a
set of "enhanced interrogation techniques"- reportedly including shaking,
slapping, prolonged standing, sleep deprivation, exposure to cold, and
waterboarding -were authorized for use by the CIA on high-value al Qaeda
2g. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., on Application of Treaties and Laws
to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and
William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Def. (Jan. 22, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS,
supra note 2, at 81, at 89.
30. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., on Status of Taliban Forces Under
Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the
President (Feb. 7, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 2, at 136, 136.
31. Geneva III, supra note 26, 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138.
3. Bush Memo, supra note 28, at 134-35. This determination was based on the belief that
Common Article 3 "refers specifically to a condition of civil war, or a large-scale armed
conflict between a State and an armed movement within its own territory" - not to a
transnational armed conflict such as war against Afghanistan or al Qaeda. Memorandum
from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., and Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, on
Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees to William J. Haynes I,
Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Def. (Jan. 9, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 2, at 38, 44.
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detainees held abroad.3" Still, the CIA interrogation program was "palsied by
lawyers '34 and by pronounced concerns respecting the legality of interrogation
techniques under U.S. law proscribing torture. U.S. law proscribing torture
outside of the U.S. was passed pursuant to the Convention Against Torture.
1. The Torture Statute
When the United States ratified the U.N. Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), the
Senate committed to take effective measures to prevent acts of torture when
perpetrated outside of the United States." Under the terms of the subsequently
enacted criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 234 0-234 oA (Torture Statute), whether a
particular act is torture turns primarily upon whether it is "specifically
intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering. '', 6 The statute
does not define "severe" for purposes of describing physical pain constituting
torture. The statute is more forthcoming when it comes to mental pain or
suffering. The statute says that here "severe" describes "prolonged mental
harm" caused by the infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain
or suffering, the use or threatened use of mind-altering drugs, and threats of
imminent death or that a third party will be subjected to death, physical pain,
or mind-altering substances.37
The Senate also acceded to Article 16 of the CAT and committed the United
States to prevent "cruel, inhumane or degrading" (CID) treatment, but "only
insofar as the term [CID] means the cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment or
punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments
to the Constitution of the United States. '' 8 The treaty did not call for state
parties to implement measures pursuant to this commitment, and no law
criminalizing CID treatment was passed. The Bush Administration, relying on
jurisprudence suggesting that constitutional guarantees do not apply
33. Brian Ross & Richard Esposito, CIA's Harsh Interrogation Techniques Described, ABC NEws,
Nov. 18, 20oS, http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/Investigation/story?id=1322866.
34. Frontline: The Torture Question, Interview with Michael Scheuer,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ pages/frondine/torture/interviews/scheuer.html (last visited
Feb. 11, 2009) [hereinafter Scheuer Interview].
35. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39 th Sess., Supp. No. 51, UN Doc. A/39/51
(1984), 1465 U.N.T.S. 8S, 114 (June 26, 1987).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1) (2000).
37. Id. § 2340(2).
38. S. ExEC. REP. No. 101-30, at 36 (199o) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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extraterritorially to aliens, 9 contended that constitutional prohibitions of CID
treatment did not extend beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the United States
to aliens held in U.S. custody overseas, and for a time understood its legal
obligations in light of this perceived incorporated geographic limitation.4"
The Torture Statute, then, was seen as the only applicable legal limit on
interrogation of unlawful combatants. But the statute gave uncertain guidance,
and skittish lawyers in the CIA general counsel's office sought assurance from
the Department of Justice that the CIA interrogation program was legal under
the statute.4' The resulting Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) legal memorandum
concluded that the Torture Statute "proscribes acts inflicting, and that are
specifically intended to inflict, severe pain or suffering, whether mental or
physical. '42 The memo construed the indeterminate word "severe"-when
applied to physical pain-to encompass only pain "equivalent in intensity to
the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure,
impairment of bodily function, or even death."4 For mental pain or suffering
to qualify as torture, the memo concluded, it "must result in significant
psychological harm of significant duration, e.g., lasting for months or even
years." '  Thus, at least in the abstract, the memo instructs that the use of
interrogation methods falling short of causing physical pain comparable to
organ failure or long-term significant psychological harm would not constitute
torture and consequently could not be prosecuted as criminal acts under the
Torture Statute. The memo also opined that criminal liability resulting from
transgression of the statute could be avoided by invoking a necessity defense or
self-defense, and that the torture law itself violated the President's
constitutional Commander-in-Chief power-because it prevented him from
39. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494
U.S. 259 (199o); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). This position was taken
notwithstanding Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 275-78
(Kennedy, J., concurring), which appeared to suggest that such a determination is
contingent upon the right at question and the particular circumstances, and without the
benefit of a clear articulation of that proposition as was recently provided in Boumediene v.
Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
40. Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Att'y Gen., to Senator Patrick J. Leahy (Apr. 4,
2005) [hereinafter Moschella Letter], available at http://www.pegc.us/archive/DOJ/
moschellaletter_20050404.pdf. For a different take, see Abraham D. Sofaer, No Exceptions,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 2005, at Ali.
41. See Joby Warrick, Justice Advised CIA in '02 About Legal Waterboarding, WASH. POST, July 25,
2008, at A8.
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gaining necessary intelligence to prevent future attacks -and so could not bind
executive branch officials. 45 A second, still mostly classified, memorandum
addressed the legality of specific techniques already in use or proposed for
use, 4 6 reportedly providing guidance as to the approved frequency and
duration of their use. 47 By virtue of the OLC memoranda, the CIA lawyers, and
the policymakers and interrogators they advised, thought they had been given
a legal "blank check.
4 8
Still, even in the face of such expansive legal absolution, all reports suggest
that CIA concerns regarding legality did not dissipate. 49 During the immediate
post-9/11 period the urgency to avert another attack was great, but so too were
CIA concerns involving the potential legal fallout from going too far. 0 Indeed,
despite the "golden shield" that the Justice Department had provided, it has
been reported that CIA Director George Tenet, fearful of overstepping lawful
boundaries and exposing his agents to legal liability, regularly sought
45. Id. at 204-07.
46. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen. (Aug. 1, 2002), available at
http://www.aclu.org/projects/foiasearch/pdf/DOJOLCooo6oi.pdf. The recipient of this
memorandum is redacted, but the ACLU reports that it was the CIA. See American Civil
Liberties Union, Documents Released by the CIA and Justice Department in Response to
the ACLU's Torture FOIA (July 24, 20o8), http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/search/
searchdetail.php?r=4558&q=.
47. See Shane et al., Secret, supra note 5.
48. GOLDSMITH, supra note 24, at 1Si.
49. See Ross & Esposito, supra note 33; Warrick, supra note 41.
50. See Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, loth Cong. lo
(20o8) [hereinafter OLC Hearing] (statement of Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy
Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Dep't of Justice); Worldwide Threats: Hearing
Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, uoth Cong. (20o8) (on file with author)
(statement of General Michael Hayden, Director of Central Intelligence) [hereinafter
Hayden Testimony, Feb. 7, 20o8]; Current and Projected National Security Threats: Hearing
Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence loth Cong. (2oo8) (on file with author) (statement
of General Michael Hayden, Director of Central Intelligence) [hereinafter Hayden
Testimony, Feb. 5, 2008]; Mark Mazzetti, C.I.A. Destroyed 2 Tapes Showing Interrogations,
N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 7, 2007, at Al; Memorandum from George Tenet, Dir. of Cent.
Intelligence (Jan. 28, 2003), available at .http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/
cia-3684_ooi.pdf. Although the recipient is redacted in this memorandum, the ACLU
reports that it was addressed to the Office of Legal Counsel. See American Civil Liberties
Union, Documents Released by the CIA and Justice Department in Response to the ACLU's





confirmation from the National Security Council's Principals Committee"1 that
the use of particular techniques was legal. s2
There were other concerns, as well. Some CIA officers declined training in
the use of coercive techniques, resisting based on discomfort with their use and
notions of propriety. s3 The New York Times has reported that the "more
cerebral" interrogators left the "infliction of pain and panic" to others -to the
"gung-ho paramilitary types," the derisively described "knuckledraggers." ' 4
Such reporting is somewhat outsized, but if generally accurate may be
suggestive of attitudes and moral concerns within the Agency. Loftier
considerations appear also to have animated beliefs. One officer-who opted out
of training said later that techniques such as waterboarding should at least give
us pause "[b]ecause we are Americans, and we're better than that.""5
Interestingly, it does not appear that a belief in the inefficacy of coercion
factored prominently among the concerns regarding the use of harsh methods
of interrogation. s6 Rather, as the urgency of the threat declined, and as other
intelligence sources and methods began providing intelligence, perceptions
regarding the appropriateness 7 and instrumentality (vis-4-vis other available
avenues of information acquisition) of coercive methods appear to have
militated against the use of harsh interrogation techniques5
8
Still, the primary concern remained legality. The Agency, it turns out, was
prescient in its skepticism- despite almost total legal absolution from the
51. This committee consists of Vice President Dick Cheney, National Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and
Attorney General John Ashcroft. See Jan Crawford Greenburg, Howard L. Rosenberg &
Ariane de Vogue, Sources: Top Bush Advisors Approved 'Enhanced Interrogation,' ABC NEWS,
Apr. 9, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/LawPolitics/story?id=4583256.
52. Id.
53. See Ross & Esposito, supra note 33; ABC World News, Interview by Brian Ross with John
Kiriakou 25,
http://abcnews.go.conVimages/Blotter/brianross kiriakou-transcriptiblottero7121o.pdf, at
25 (last visited Mar. 8, 2009) [hereinafter Kiriakou Interview].
s4. Shane, Interrogation, supra note 5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. Kiriakou Interview, supra note 53, at 29.
s6. Perhaps this was a function of the same uncertainty that characterizes the debate over
efficacy in the public sphere. For an overview of this debate, see BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW
AND THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF TERROR 191-98 (2008).
s. See Ross & Esposito, supra note 33; Shane, Interrogation, supra note 5.
s8. See DNI Authorities and Personnel Issues: Hearing of the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, i1oth
Cong. (2008) (on file with author) (statement of Admiral Michael McConnell, Director of
National Intelligence); Hayden Testimony, Feb. 7, 2008, supra note 50; Hayden Testimony,
Feb. 5, 2008, supra note 50.
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Justice Department. In June 2004, the August 2002 memorandum that had so
narrowly parsed the word "severe" was withdrawn by OLC. A new and less
permissive memorandum provided a more modest construction of practices
constituting torture. The new guidance concluded that Congress had not
intended only to criminalize practices causing "excruciating and agonizing
pain," 9 but declined to disavow the earlier position on presidential power on
the basis that it was unnecessary to address.6"
Whatever the proper interpretation of the replacement, the withdrawal of
the original memorandum appears to have precipitated the suspension of some
techniques and exacerbated preexisting CIA uncertainty and concerns
regarding the continued legality of enhanced techniques." Indeed, earlier in
the spring a CIA Inspector General report had reportedly questioned the
supposed inapplicability of the ban on CID treatment to interrogations of
aliens abroad, had determined that some of the techniques authorized did
indeed constitute CID treatment under the Torture Convention, and expressed
concern about interrogators' legal liability. 62 Thus, in June, by the time the
previous legal guidance was repudiated, the New York Times reported that
"[c]onfusion about the legal limits of interrogation has begun to slow
government efforts to obtain information from suspected terrorists" even as
counterterrorism officials feared the summer months would bring renewed
attacks.63
2. The Fifih Amendment
Two months after the rescission of the August 2002 memorandum, a
worried August 4, 2004, memorandum from the CIA to the OLC described
congressional and judicial developments that also appeared to question the
legal foundation undergirding its interrogation program.6 4 The memorandum
5g. Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel on
Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-234oA to the Deputy Att'y Gen. (Dec.
30, 2004) [hereinafter Levin Memo], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
olc/18usc234o234oa2.htm.
6o. Id.
61. See Shane, supra note 11.
62. See Douglas Jehl, Report Warned C.I.A. on Tactics in Interrogation, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 9, 2005,
at Ai.
63. David Johnston, Uncertainty About Interrogation Rules Seen as Slowing the Hunt for
Information on Terrorists, N.Y. TiMEs, June 28, 2004, at A8.
64. See Memorandum (Aug. 4, 2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/




recounts previous legal guidance to the effect that waterboarding did not
violate the Torture Statute and that Article 16 of the Convention Against
Torture did not apply extraterritorially. The first legal conclusion was now of
course uncertain following the retraction of the August 2002 memorandum.
The sustainability of the second was now under question in advance of
congressional attempts6s to extend the CAT prohibition on "cruel, inhumane
or degrading" treatment to interrogations abroad and following the Supreme
Court's decision in Rasul v. Bush,66 which according to the memorandum
"raises possible concerns about future US judicial review.",6,
A new series of OLC memoranda, apparently issued in response to such
concerns, sought to provide greater legal clarity. It was reported that a
February 2005 memorandum gave legal sanction to the harshest techniques
yet, endorsing the use of "combined effects" that included the simultaneous
use of such techniques as head slapping and temperature extremes.68 Then, as
Congress continued to consider the extension of the CAT's prohibition on CID
treatment to detainees in U.S. custody regardless of location-a direct
repudiation of the administration's position that the prohibition on CID
treatment in the CAT did not have extraterritorial reach-the OLC issued
another memorandum.69 The memorandum analyzed the impact of a proposed
law that defined CID treatment as acts regardless of location committed that
would be held unconstitutional under the Fifth, Eighth, or Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution. The resulting OLC memorandum reportedly
concluded that the authorized CIA interrogation techniques would still be
lawful under the proposed standards."0 The opinion found that only conduct
OLC. See American Civil Liberties Union, Documents Released by the CIA and Justice
Department in Response to the ACLU's Torture FOIA (July 24, 2oo8),
http ://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/search/searchdetail.php ?r=4558&q=.
65. The memorandum refers to Senator Richard Durbin's amendment to the 2005 defense
authorization bill that sought to make unlawful, wherever committed, the use of cruel,
inhumane, and degrading treatment. 15o CONG. REc. S6 784 (daily ed. June 15, 2004)
(statement of Sen. Richard Durbin). That particular amendment was ultimately
unsuccessful, but the passage of the McCain Amendment (called the Detainee Treatment
Act) later that year accomplished the same objective. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-148, § loo1-ioo6, 119 Star. 2680, 2739-44. The Act is included (as Title X) in
the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 20o6 and was signed into law on
December 30, 2005.
66. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
67. See Memorandum, supra note 64.
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that "shocks the conscience" is unconstitutional, and that therefore even the
use of waterboarding (as used by the CIA)7" in certain dire situations would
not amount to the "cruel, inhumane, and degrading" treatment proscribed
under the proposed statute.72 OLC memoranda subsequent to the passage of
the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) are said to have confirmed this
conclusion.
73
This line of reasoning holds that Supreme Court jurisprudence-most
prominently reflected in Ingraham v. Wright74 -cabins the relevance of the
Eighth Amendment prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishment" to post-
conviction treatment in the criminal justice system. 7 Furthermore, this perhaps
contestable position posits that the due process guarantees of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments can be understood -based on Rochin v. California76 -
to bar only interrogation methods, when used in searches unrelated to an
interest in prosecution, that "shock the conscience." 77 Rochin can be
understood, as then-Attorney General Michael Mukasey recently averred, 7 to
suggest that such a determination depends on the circumstances of the case: a
weighing of the coercion used against the value or legitimacy of the
government's objective.7 9 In letters to Congress during this time8o the
Administration cited to County of Sacramento v. Lewis for the proposition that
the "shocks the conscience" standard provides protection against "only the
71. OLC Hearing, supra note 5o, at 18 (statement of Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy
Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Dep't of Justice).
72. Shane et al., Secret, supra note 5.
73. See id.
74. 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977).
75. ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT,
RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE i35 (2002); RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE
CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY 8o (2006).
76. 342 U.S. 165, 172-74 (1952).
77. ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, Is THERE A RIGHT To REMAIN SILENT?: COERCWVE INTERROGATION
AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AFTER 9/11, at 22-23 (2008); Alan M. Dershowitz, Torture
Should Be Legalized and Regulated, in Is TORTURE EVER JUSTIFIED? 22, 24 (Tom Head ed.,
2005). This position, allegedly maintained in the OLC memoranda, was articulated later by
then-Attorney General designate Michael Mukasey. See Letter from Att'y Gen. Michael B.
Mukasey to the Democratic Members of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Oct. 30, 2007),
available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/2007l0/O-30-07%2Mukasey%2Oto%2oDems.pdf.
78. See Oversight of the U.S. Department of Justice: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
1ioth Cong. (20o8) (on file with author) (statement of Michael Mukasey, Att'y Gen. of the
United States).
79. See POSNER, supra note 7S, at 80-85.




most egregious official conduct," such as "conduct intended to injure in some




Despite the additional legal interpretations reportedly sanctioning the
CIA's most aggressive techniques yet disclosed, nervousness and uncertainty
persisted within the Agency. These concerns were echoed by then-CIA Director
Porter Goss who suggested in November 2005-after Congress had voted to
extend the prohibition on CID treatment to detainees wherever helds2 but
before President Bush had signed the bill into law-that some techniques said
to have yielded valuable intelligence would now be restricted.s Indeed, after
the passage of the bill 8 and despite the Administration's signing statement
affirming the President's prerogative as Commander in Chief to act free of any
unconstitutional restraints imposed by the Act,8 , the CIA modified its policy as
a consequence, and certain techniques were disallowed.86 A former assistant
general counsel at the CIA remarked during this period that the "ambiguity in
the law must 'cause nightmares for intelligence officers who are engaged in
aggressive interrogations of Al Qaeda suspects and other terrorism suspects."
87
Whether attributable to increasing fear within the CIA of litigation over actions
taken with the imprimatur of changing law, or the uncertainty of determining
what was then lawful under the new legal rules, interrogations reportedly
ceased.88 Continued and expansive legal authorization was not enough to ease
the uncertainty.
81. 523 U.S. 833, 846-50 (1998). Vice President Dick Cheney endorsed the shocks-the-
conscience standard in December 2005. See Cheney Roars Back: The Nightline Interview
During His Trip to Iraq, ABC NEWS, Dec. 18, 2005,
http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/IraqCoverage/story?id=14192o6.
82. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ looi-ioo6, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739-
44.
83. See Joel Roberts, CIA Chief. We Don't Torture, CBS NEWS, Nov. 21, 2005,
http://www.cbsnews.con/stories/2oo5/11/2/politics/mainio63381.shtml.
84. See Detainee Treatment Act S 1003(a), (d).
S5. See Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations To Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act,
2006,41 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1918, 1919 (Dec. 30, 2005).
86. See OLC Hearing, supra note 50, at 7 (prepared statement of Steven G. Bradbury, Principal
Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Dep't of Justice); Shane et al., Secret,
supra note 5.
87. Jehl, supra note 62.
88. See Andrew C. McCarthy, Waterboarding and Torture: Jonathan Turley's Irresponsible Attack
on Judge Mukasey, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Oct. 26, 2007, http://article.nationalreview.com/
?q=ZjhkM2YyZmE5MThjZGNIN2IyMGI4MmE3MWM1OWQ 5 MjA.
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3. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld and the Military Commissions Act
Then the law fundamentally changed. In June 2006, in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court construed the Geneva Conventions' Common
Article 3 as applicable to detainees in the War on Terror and applied its
prohibition of irregular tribunals -incorporated through the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ) - to military commissions of unlawful combatants. As
noted, however, Common Article 3 also proscribes "violence to life and person,
in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture," and
"outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment. 8 9 In 199 6, Congress criminalized violations of Common Article 3 in
a federal war crimes statute."° Thus, while the DTA had made CID treatment
unlawful, Hamdan's application of Common Article 3 to the War on Terror had
the consequence of making any violation of Common Article 3-say,
committing humiliating and degrading treatment -a federal felony. Suddenly
it seemed as if the gap between legal rules operating at an altitude of generality
and the practical policy flexibility below was rapidly closing.
This, however, would not last long. To clarify how Common Article 3, and
its vague and contestable terms, would now apply to interrogations in the War
on Terror, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act (MCA). The MCA
amended the War Crimes Act and delineated what conduct would constitute a
"grave breach" of Common Article 3, and thus constitute a criminally
prosecutable war crime. The statute limits grave breaches -violations giving
rise to penal sanctions - to include, for example, torture and cruel or inhumane
treatment. Torture is characterized as "severe physical or mental pain or
suffering."'" Cruel or inhuman treatment is described as constituting "serious
physical or mental pain or suffering"92 that is defined as "extreme pain."93 The
MCA, therefore, elides any real difference between the two, at least with
respect to physical pain, by only differentiating the conditions based upon
whether severe or extreme pain is inflicted. The Act appears to establish a lower
threshold for the infliction of cruel or inhumane treatment's "serious mental
pain or suffering," which it distinguishes from torture's "severe mental pain or
89. Geneva III, supra note 26, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138.
go. See War Crimes Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-192, § 2, 11o Stat. 2104, 2104 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441 (West Supp. 2008)).
g. Military Commissions Act of 20o6, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6(b)(i)(B), 120 Stat. 2600, 2633
(codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441(d)(1)(A)).
92. Id.
93. Id., 120 Stat. at 2634.
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suffering" based on the former not having to constitute "prolonged mental
harm" but merely "non-transitory mental harm."94
Indeed, after largely equating "cruel or inhumane treatment" with the legal
definition of torture, the law delegates to the president the authority to identify
by executive order what lesser forms of degradation and abuse -misconduct
not rising to.the level of a grave breach and therefore not subject to prosecution
as war crimes -would still violate treaty obligations under Common Article 3.9'
Thus, by construing the threshold severity of "cruel or inhumane treatment" as
nearly identical to that of torture, and by establishing "outrages upon personal
dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment" as a presidentially
determined violation but not as a prosecutable grave breach, the Act nearly
obviated the relevance of Hamdan to interrogation.
The resulting executive order-defining treaty violations of Common
Article 3 that do not give rise to penal sanctions -accomplished much of the
same.96 The order proscribed "acts of violence" - but only those acts "serious
enough to be considered comparable to murder, torture, mutilation, and cruel
or inhumane treatment" as defined by the MCA.97 The heart of the order
construed Common Article 3's generic prohibition of "outrages upon personal
dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment" as "willful and
outrageous acts of personal abuse committed for the purpose of humiliation or
degrading the individual in a manner so serious that any reasonable person,
considering the circumstances, would deem the acts to be beyond the bounds
of human decency." 98 As such, any analysis of the prohibition would require a
consideration of the circumstances of the case-exactly like the "shock the
conscience" test. Under the definition provided, willful and outrageous acts of
personal abuse done for the purpose of eliciting information to prevent future
attacks might have been permissible.
Responding to the concerns of interrogators and Agency officials worried
about the legal ramifications of their involvement, the order affirmed that it did
not give rise to legally enforceable rights against the United States, but that it
did offer CIA employees a possible legal defense against claims of wrongdoing.
A statement accompanying the order declared that the "President has insisted
94. Id., 12o Stat. at 2635. This was also suggested by Steven G. Bradbury. See OLC Hearing,
supra note 5o, at 24 (statement of Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att'y
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Dep't of Justice).
9S. See Military Commissions Act § 6(a)(3)(A)-(C).
96. See Exec. Order No. 13,440, 3 C.F.R. 229 (2008).
97. Id. § 3(b)(i)(C), 3 C.F.R. 230.
98. Id. § 3(b)(i)(E), 3 C.F.R. 230. Examples provided include "sexual or sexually indecent acts
undertaken for the purpose of humiliation." Id.
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on clear legal standards so that CIA officers involved in this essential work are
not placed in jeopardy for doing their job."9 9 CIA Director Michael Hayden
echoed this sentiment, noting that the "president's action ... gives us the legal
clarity we have sought.""1 0 While it certainly did give greater clarity to the
operative terms of Common Article 3, the terms of the order left a great deal of
latitude in which more or less permissive constructions could be articulated.
Like the act it partially implemented, and the treaty it interpreted, the order did
not specify clearly what was permissible (or not), leaving much room for
interpretation. Indeed, at least in part because of this fact, a "high level of
anxiety about political retribution" and criminal prosecution for the
interrogation program remained within the CIA.' A number of CIA officers
expected to be "thrown under the bus" and have reportedly taken out liability
insurance to mitigate any future legal fees.'0 2
On January 22, 2009, two days into the new administration of President
Barack Obama, an executive order entitled "Ensuring Lawful Interrogations"
was issued. 3 The main thrust of the order is to restrict the CIA, for the
present, to use of the largely innocuous and noncoercive techniques'0 4 to which
the military is currently limited.' Whether this will remain the standard is as
yet unclear. The order establishes a task force to consider whether the Army
techniques "provide an appropriate means of acquiring the intelligence
necessary to protect the Nation, and, if warranted, to recommend any
additional or different guidance for the [CIA] .,io6 The new order superseded0 7
99. Bush Alters Rules for Interrogation, MSNBC, July 27, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/
id/1987 3 9 18/.
ioo. Press Release, Central Intelligence Agency, Director's Statement on Executive Order on
Detentions, Interrogations (July 20, 2007), https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-
releases-statements/press-release-archive-20o7/statement-on-executive-order.htm; see also
David Morgan, Bush Puts CIA Prisons Under Geneva Conventions, REUTERS, July 20, 2007,
http ://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSN2o29 51972oo7o72o (reporting on
Hayden's statement).
iol. Jane Mayer, The Black Sites: A Rare Look Inside the C.IA. 's Secret Interrogation Program, NEW
YORKER, Aug. 13, 2007, at 46, 49 (internal quotation marks omitted).
102. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
103. Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 22, 2009), available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2oog/DCPD2oo9oooo7.pdf.
104. See infra text accompanying notes 136-142.
105. Exec. Order No. 13,491, § ( 3 )(b), 74 Fed. Reg. at 4894.
io6. Id. § (5)(e)(i), 74 Fed. Reg. at 4895.
107. The order also revoked any other inconsistent executive directives, orders, and regulations -
"including but not limited to those issued to or by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
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the previously discussed executive order that construed Common Article 3's
prohibition of humiliating and degrading treatment. °8 It did not provide a
new interpretation." 9 The Obama Administration will, therefore, also need-to
determine-if it .is first found desirable to establish a more flexible separate
protocol of techniques for CIA intelligence interrogations -what lesser forms
of degradation and abuse not constituting prosecutable crimes would
nevertheless still constitute a violation of treaty obligations under Common
Article 3. This determination will serve as a necessary antecedent component of
any effort to establish CIA interrogation protocols that deviate materially from
the mild Army Field Manual to which the CIA is now confined. The new
administration may well have a more inclusive notion than the previous
administration of what kinds of methods would contravene Common Article
3's proscription and therefore be precluded; but the current order does not
resolve this issue.
The legal landscape in 2009 is much changed from 2001. But all of the
current restrictions can be interpreted to permit coercive interrogation tactics.
Absolute bans on vaguely defined abuse still provide the interpretative latitude
to make possible the most extreme measures yet approved post-9/11 -that is,
waterboarding." ° Despite all the legal change, not only are the legal
prohibitions that could give rise to penal sanctions nearly identical to what they
were in 2001, but the essential character of the legal rules as extraordinarily
from September 11, 2001, to January 20, 2009"-concerning detention or interrogation. Id.
§ (1), 74 Fed. Reg. at 4893.
108. Exec. Order No. 13,440, § 3(b)(i)(E), 3 C.F.R. 229, 230 (2007).
log. The order only notes circuitously that "'humiliating and degrading treatment' refer to, and
have the same meaning as, those same terms in Common Article 3." Exec. Order No. 13,491,
§ (2)(0, 74 Fed. Reg. at 4893.
11o. In a letter sent to Chairman Patrick J. Leahy the day before a January 30, 2008 Senate
Judiciary Committee oversight hearing, Attorney General Mukasey wrote that while
waterboarding was not then currently authorized for use, "[t]here are some circumstances
where current law would appear clearly to prohibit the use of waterboarding. Other
circumstances would present a far closer question." Letter from Michael B. Mukasey, Att'y
Gen., to Senator Patrick J. Leahy (Jan. 29, 20o8), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/
speeches/20o8/letter-leahy-o13oo8.pdf. As of February 2008, the Office of Legal Counsel
had not opined as to the legality of waterboarding under then-current law. See OLC
Hearing, supra note 50, at 13 (statement of Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant
Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Dep't of Justice). However, Admiral McConnell, the
Director of National Intelligence, stated that "[t]he question is, is waterboarding a legal
technique? And everything I know, based on the appropriate authority to make that
judgment, it is a legal technique used in a specific set of circumstances. You have to know
the circumstances to be able to make the judgment." Current and Projected National Security
Threats: Open Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, iioth Cong. (2008) (on file
with author) (statement of Admiral McConnell, Director of National Intelligence).
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flexible, vague, and subject to great interpretation has remained constant. Yet
to a surprising extent given the legal latitude afforded, the CIA has nevertheless
remained troubled by the use of coercion and "haunted by uncertainty," greatly
constrained in what they felt could be authorized without leaving open the
possibility of future inquiries and criminal sanctions."'
B. Law and Interrogation: The Department of Defense
The military's experience mirrors in important ways that of the CIA.
Confronted with pressing security threats and flexible laws read to provide
expansive policy latitude, the Department of Defense (DoD) civilian leadership
authorized methods of coercive interrogation that were resisted- successfully
in part-by the military for reasons of institutional character and fear of legal
repercussions.
The most aggressive high-level expression of policy guidance1'2 with
respect to military interrogations was provided on December 2, 2002, when
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld approved the use of certain
interrogation techniques for use on Mohammed A1-Qahtani- believed to have
been directly involved in the September 11 plot-who had proven resistant to
standard interrogation techniques.'13 The techniques authorized included the
use of stress positions (like standing) for a maximum of four hours, isolation
for up to thirty days, interrogations lasting for up to twenty hours per day,
deprivation of light and auditory stimuli, and the use of "detainee-individual
phobias-such as fear of dogs-to induce stress.""' 4 "Use of mild non-injurious
mii. Shane et al., Secret, supra note 5.
112. This is distinguished from policy originating at the level of the military's regional combatant
commands. The formal written authorization of December 2, 2002, was apparently preceded
by a voice-command from the Secretary of Defense verbally authorizing some techniques for
use on Al-Qahtani beginning on November 23, 2002, that were not included in the Field
Manual. See Coercive Interrogation Hearing, supra note 19 (statement of Sen. Dianne
Feinstein, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
113. See, e.g., Coercive Interrogation Hearing, supra note 19 (statement of Philippe Sands, Professor
of Law and Director of the Centre of International Courts and Tribunals, University College
London); Origins of Aggressive Interrogation Techniques: Hearing Before the S. Armed Services
Comm., lioth Cong. (2008) (on file with author) (hereinafter Origins of Interrogation
Hearing] (statement of William Haynes II, former General Counsel, Department of
Defense); id. at 78 (statement of Jane G. Dalton, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, Ret., former
Advisor to Joint Chiefs of Staff).
114. Phifer Memo, supra note 6, at 227.
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physical contact such as grabbing, poking in the chest with the finger, and light
pushing" required special permission."I
This limited authorization was, however, rescinded after barely one month.
Notwithstanding that neither the law, nor the administration's understanding
of the applicability of the law, changed during this period, concerns over
illegality remained and appear at least in part to have precipitated the
withdrawal.",6 Reservations expressed by the General Counsel of the
Department of the Navy, Alberto Mora, are said to have most directly
prompted the withdrawal of the December 2, 2002, authorizations." 7 Mora
disagreed with the legal analysis provided to justify the use of coercive
methods. He found the following notion to constitute a "serious failure[] of
legal analysis":
cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment could be inflicted on the
Guantanamo detainees with near impunity because, at least in that
location, no law prohibited such action, no court would be vested with
jurisdiction to entertain a complaint on such allegations, and various
defenses (such as good motive or necessity) would shield any U.S.
official accused of the unlawful behavior ....8
The Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps concurred, worried about the
sufficiency of the legal analysis and the potential for prosecutions of
servicemen." 9
The concerns expressed, however, did not relate only to illegality and the
possibility of accusations or prosecutions for criminal conduct. They also
reflect apprehension regarding the instrumentality of the military performing
115. Id.
116. See Origins of Interrogation Hearing, supra note 113, at 25, 35 (statement of William Haynes II,
former General Counsel, Department of Defense).
117. See id.; Albert T. Church III, Unclassified Executive Summary 4 (Mar. 2005), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2oos/d2ooSo 31oexe.pdf.
118. Memorandum from Alberto J. Mora, Gen. Counsel of the Dep't of the Navy, on Statement
for the Record: Office of General Counsel Involvement in Interrogation Issues to Inspector
Gen., Dep't of the Navy (July 7, 2004) [hereinafter Mora Memo], available at
http://www.newyorker.com/images/pdfs/moramemo.pdf.
119. STAFF OF THE S. COMM. ON THE ARMED FORCES, 110TH CONG., ORIGINS OF AGGRESSIVE
INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES: PART I OF THE COMMITTEE'S INQUIRY INTO THE TREATMENT
OF DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY, at tabs 10-14 (Comm. Print 20o8) (collecting documents
referred to by Sen. Carl Levin, Chairman, S. Comm. on Armed Services) [hereinafter
ORIGINS OF AGGRESSIVE INTERROGATION], available at http://levin.senate.gov/newsroon/
supporting/2oo8/Documents.SASC.o617o8.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 20o8).
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coercive types of interrogation, and worries that the military's institutional
values make it ill-suited to use coercive means of interrogation. The first
concern regarded not a substantiated scientific belief in the inefficacy of
coercive interrogation itself, '° but rather the military's value added in the use
of such methods. Some believed that as "military interrogators were typically
young and had little or no training or experience in interrogations" there was a
real question as to whether they could implement the use of such techniques
successfully.' 1 The second consideration dealt with the appropriateness of
harsh methods and whether they were "unworthy of the military services."' 22 A
few days before the approval was rescinded, on January 9, 2003, the General
Counsel of the Navy worried to the General Counsel .of DoD that "[e]ven if
one wanted to authorize the U.S. military to conduct coercive interrogations, as
was the case in Guantanamo, how could one do so without profoundly altering
its core values and character?
12 3
After the withdrawal of the December techniques, the Secretary of Defense
directed the DoD General Counsel to establish a working group charged with
considering the legality of possible interrogation methods and to make
recommendations concerning employment of particular interrogation
techniques.' 4 The working group was chaired by the General Counsel of the
Air Force,' 25 and included participation from the general counsels and Judge
Advocates General from the military branches, and lawyers from the Office of
the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff. 26 The resulting report indicated
120. See Mora Memo, supra note 118, at 11; see also ORIGINS OF AGGRESSIVE INTERROGATION,
supra note 119, at tabs 10-14 (collecting documents referred to by Sen. Carl Levin, Chairman,
S. Comm. on Armed Services), available at http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/
supporting/2oo8/Documents.SASC.o617o8.pdf (raising legal and policy concerns with
proposed interrogation techniques). Note, however, the suggestion of uncertain utility. Id.
121. Mora Memo, supra note 118, at 4; see also DNIAuthorities and Personnel Issues, supra note 58,
(statement of Admiral Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence) (noting that
military interrogators are "generally younger, less experienced and less trained").
122. JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 104 (2006)
(quoting Alberto Mora).
123. Mora Memo, supra note 118, at ii.
124. Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, Sec'y of Def., on Detainee Interrogations to Gen.
Counsel, Dep't of Def. (Jan. 15, 2003), in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 2, at 238.
125. Memorandum from William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Def., on Working Group
To Assess Legal, Policy, and Operational Issues Relating to Interrogation of Detainees Held
by the U.S. Armed Forces in the War on Terrorism to Gen. Counsel, Dep't of the Air Force
(Jan. 17, 2003), in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 2, at 240.
126. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS IN THE
GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL, HISTORICAL, POLICY, AND
118:1434 2009
INTERROGATION'S LAW
that a number of the techniques evaluated would potentially violate certain
UCMJ prohibitions- including bans on assaults, threats, and cruelty or
maltreatment 127-but reasoned, based upon a March 14, 2003, OLC
memorandum,128 that like the federal torture ban "any other potentially
applicable statute must be construed as inapplicable to interrogations
undertaken pursuant to [the President's] Commander-in-Chief authority."'2 9
Despite the expansive legal authorities that OLC had provided the military,
concerns remained. Indeed, there was dissension within the working group
itself, as Judge Advocates General from the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and
Army all expressed similar objections both to reliance on the Justice
Department's analysis and to the use of harsh interrogation techniques. 3
The concerns, again, were primarily twofold. One concern was that the
Justice Department's legal positions were controversial -that "domestic courts
may well disagree with DoJ/OLC's interpretation of the law" - and that "while
the current administration [was] not likely to pursue prosecution[s], it [was]
impossible to predict how future administrations will view the use of such
techniques."'' The other concern related to the propriety of such a policy: how
would the use of more extreme interrogation techniques affect armed forces
culture and the servicemembers trained to take the "legal and moral 'high-
road"'? 3 Was this the "'right thing' for U.S. military personnel?' 13 3 Or would
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS (2003) [hereinafter WORKING GROUP REPORT], reprinted in
THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 2, at 286.
127. Id. at 325-30.
128. See Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., on Military Interrogation of
Alien Unlawful Combatants Held Outside the United States to William J. Haynes II, Gen.
Counsel of the Dep't of Def. (Mar. 14, 2003), available at http://www.aclu.org/safefree/
torture/34745res2oo3o314.html.
129. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 126, at 303.
130. See infra text accompanying notes 131-135.
131. Memorandum from Jack L. Rives, Major Gen., Deputy Judge Advocate Gen., U.S. Air
Force, on Final Report and Recommendations of the Working Group To Assess the Legal,
Policy and Operational Issues Relating to Interrogation of Detainees Held by the U.S.
Armed Forces in the War on Terrorism to General Counsel, U.S. Air Force (Feb. 5, 2003)
(hereinafter Rives Memo], in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA 377 (Karen J. Greenberg
ed., 2006); see Memorandum from Thomas J. Romig, Major Gen., Judge Advocate Gen.,
U.S. Army, on Draft Report and Recommendations of the Working Group To Access [sic]
the Legal, Policy and Operational Issues Related to Interrogation of Detainees Held by the
U.S. Armed Forces in the War on Terrorism to Gen. Counsel, Dep't of the Air Force (Mar.
3, 2003), in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA, supra, at 386.
132. Rives Memo, supra note 131, at 378; see Memorandum from Kevin M. Sandkuhler, Brigadier
Gen., U.S. Marine Corps, on Working Group Recommendations on Detainee
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the "American people find [the military] missed the forest for the trees by
condoning practices that, while technically legal, are inconsistent with our
most fundamental values ?' 4 The potential diminution of armed forces'
"[p]ride, [d]iscipline, and [s]elf-[r]espect" was a unifying concern throughout
all JAG divisions of the military.'
3
In late 2005 the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) proscribed military
personnel from employing "any treatment or technique of interrogation not
authorized by and listed in the United States Army Field Manual on
Intelligence Interrogation."'' 6 While of course limited by applicable laws
concerning interrogations, the DTA gave the military complete discretion to
establish (and change) its own rules, as long as after it did so it published them
and abided by the terms of the publication. The Department of the Army
promulgated a new field manual for interrogations in September of 20o6.'
37
Any deviation from the manual is, by definition, unlawful. The CIA is now also
directed by executive order to abide by this manual.1 8 Simply limiting the
military (or the CIA) to what appears in the manual - without more - does not
provide greater clarity on where the legal perimeters lie, since the Army can
revise the manual whenever it sees fit.
3 9
As an illustration, the current Army Field Manual authorizes separation as a
restricted technique for use only on unlawful enemy combatants. 4° Until an
extension is granted, physical separation from other detainees is limited to
thirty days of initial duration, during which time the detainee must not be
precluded from obtaining four hours of continuous sleep every twenty-four-
hour period. 14' Because of this policy decision we know that unlawful
Interrogations to General Counsel of the Air Force (Feb. 27, 2003) [hereinafter Sandkuhler
Memo], in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA, supra note 131, at 383.
133. Memorandum from Michael F. Lohr, Rear Admiral, Judge Advocate Gen., U.S. Navy, on
Working Group Recommendations Relating to Interrogation of Detainees to Gen. Counsel
of the Air Force (Feb. 6, 2003) [hereinafter Lohr Memo], in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN
AMERICA, supra note 131, at 382.
134. Id.
135. Sandkuhler Memo, supra note 132, at 383.
136. Detainee Treatment Act of 2oo5, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § lOO2(a), 119 Stat. 2680, 2739.
137. See DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 2-22.3 (34-52): HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR
OPERATIONS (2006) (hereinafter FM 2-22.3], available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/
army/fm2-22-3.pdf.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 103-109.
139. FM 2-22.3, supra note 137, at vi.
140. Id. at M-1.




combatants will not be kept awake for longer than twenty hours each day, and
that isolation from other prisoners beyond thirty days is contingent upon
further approval. We do not know whether the Field Manual could be legally
amended to reduce (or eliminate) the number of required continuous sleep
hours for certain periods, or whether a detainee could be isolated from other
prisoners for months (or years) at a time. The Field Manual itself does not
answer such questions; and nor, of course, does the Detainee Treatment Act
itself, which simply presumes that any techniques included in the manual are
otherwise "legal."' 42 Confining the military (or the CIA) to the Army Field
Manual only makes it less likely that the law will be contravened in light of the
document's slowly evolving and public nature.
Flexible laws, then, were read to make available techniques of interrogation
that were nevertheless resisted for virtuous, instrumental, and legal reasons.
But this was not nearly the first time that an aggressive government
interrogation policy operated within a legal architecture flexible enough to
provide latitude and unpredictable enough to still impose limits through fears
of its transgression.
II. NAVIGATING LEGAL STRICTURES: ABSOLUTE BANS AND
VAGUELY DEFINED ABUSE, 1949 TO 1973
In the aftermath of World War II, the United States participated in efforts
to create a new body of international human rights law relating to the
treatment of prisoners during peacetime, 43 and new instruments of
international humanitarian law relating to the treatment of prisoners during
war. The U.N. General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR)'" on December 10, 1948, as a declaration of international
human rights principles - not a treaty legally binding upon party nations . 4 It
provides in Article 5 that "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.' '1 6 The Geneva Conventions
142. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1002(a), 119 Stat. 2680, 2739.
143. See NIGEL S. RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (1999).
144. The UDHR is one of three instruments comprising the International Bill of Rights. The
others are the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Optional Protocols. Id. at 4.
145. See CHRIS INGELSE, THE UN COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE: AN ASSESSMENT 44 (2oo1).
146. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 5, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, 73, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., ist plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/81o (Dec. 12, 1948), available at
http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html.
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for the Protection of War Victims of 1949 were also adopted; the United States
became a signatory to the Conventions in 1949, and the Conventions entered
into force with respect to the United States on February 2, 1956.147 The United
States is legally bound thereby. There are four Conventions. Two, the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
(Geneva IV or GC),148 and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War (Geneva III or GPW)"4 9 relate directly to interrogation.
A. Geneva Conventions and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The Geneva Conventions, applicable in instances of international armed
conflict that involve a High Contracting Party, protect different classes of
persons. Geneva IV governs the treatment of civilians who, during conflict or
occupation, fall into the hands of the enemy. Civilians are entitled, under
Article 27, to humane treatment and protection against acts of violence or
threats thereof.' Articles 31 and 32 forbid, respectively, the use of "physical or
moral coercion" against protected persons, and measures causing physical
suffering.'51 Geneva III addresses the treatment of prisoners of war. Article 4
establishes the prerequisites necessary for entitlement to POW status, and thus
defines those lawful combatants who merit the attendant protections afforded
by this status. It is a four-part test: individuals party to the conflict must
belong to a hierarchical command structure; bear a distinctive sign; carry arms
openly; and behave in accordance with the laws and customs of war."5 2 Those
that qualify are entitled under Articles 13 and 130 to humane treatment, and to
protection against acts of torture, inhumane treatment, violence, intimidation,
and insults. 5 3 Article 17 states capaciously that "[n]o physical or mental
torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war"
147. See STUART HuLL MCINTYRE, LEGAL EFFECT OF WORLD WAR Il ON TREATIES OF THE UNITED
STATES 96 & n.3 (1958); JOSEPH MODESTE SWEENEY ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 857 (3d ed. 1988).
148. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T 3516, 75 U.N.T.S 287 [hereinafter Geneva IV, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/92.htm.
149. Geneva III, supra note 26, 6 U.S.T 3316, 75 U.N.T.S 135.
15o. Geneva IV, supra note 148, art. 27, 6 U.S.T at 3536, 75 U.N.T.S at 306.
151. Id. arts. 31, 32, 6 U.S.T. at 3538, 75 U.N.T.S. at 308.
152. Geneva III, supra note 26, art. 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138.





and that uncooperative prisoners may not be "threatened, insulted, or exposed
to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind."'1 4
Both the UDHR and the Geneva Conventions seem clear and absolute in
their prohibitions on torture and other ill-treatment, and not subject to great
interpretational variance. Though the provisions described provide boundaries
for what might be considered permissible conduct in the interrogation of
prisoners, definitional uncertainty remains with respect to central
interrogation-relevant terms. Geneva emphatically proscribes torture -and yet,
though it is said to be either of a "mental or physical" nature, it receives no
clear definition in the language of the Conventions. Similarly, the Conventions
do not define coercion; they provide no articulable basis upon which to
distinguish between lawful physical discomforts and illegal coercion.55 The
sense in which "humane treatment" should be understood is also left unclear.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which played an
integral role in convening the Geneva Conference that gave rise to the
Conventions, concedes in its definitive Commentary on the Geneva
Conventions that the "definition is not an easy one," but maintains that
inhumane treatment should not be construed only to mean "treatment
constituting an attack on physical integrity or health.',, 6 The ICRC
Commentary thus suggests a lower threshold in answer to the question as to
exactly when maltreatment becomes inhumane," 7 but beyond noting that the
"aim of the Convention is certainly to... prevent [prisoners of war from]
being brought down to the level of animals," the Commentary adds little
clarity."s8 The language of the Convention provides no definitive explanation of
when a certain interrogation technique would fall below the lowest acceptable
level of humane treatment. 9
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights contains the same kind of
ambiguities as the Geneva Conventions. Article 5 of the UDHR prohibits
"torture... or cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment. ,, ,6 Yet,
though oft repeated in future human rights treaties, this increasingly important
154. Id. art. 17, 6 U.S.T. at 3332, 75 U.N.T.S. at 15o.
155. See Stanley J. Glod & Lawrence J. Smith, Comments, Interrogation Under the 1949 Prisoners of
War Convention, 21 MIL. L. REv. 145, 153 (1963).
156. 3 JEAN DE PREUX, THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 39, 627 (Jean S. Pictet
ed., A.P. de Heney trans., 196o).
157. See Howard S. Levie, Prisoners of War in International Armed Conflict, 59 INT'L L. STUD. 1,356
(1979).
158. See 3 DE PREUX, supra note 156, at 627.
159. See Levie, supra note 157, at 356-57.
16o. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 146, art. 5, at 73.
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formula offered no indication in 1948 of how its prohibition should be put into
effect. Should it be understood as a totality, or should its major component
parts be divided: torture -and other CID "ill-treatment"?'61 If they are to be
distinguished, criteria by which distinctions can be drawn, say, between torture
and inhumane treatment, or between other ill-treatment and levels of
discomfort not prohibited, must also be established.
A former Special Rapporteur on Torture of the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights has noted with respect to these proscriptions that "it is in the
nature of such... formula[s] to be elastic and capable of evolving
interpretation over time. '' , 62 Nevertheless, in a rapidly changing postwar
world, what exactly was meant by such terms as torture, coercion, or inhumane
treatment was not delineated clearly in international humanitarian or human
rights law. Depending upon the interrogator's historical or legal-cultural
perspective, the prohibitions established could be understood to operate in
strikingly varied ways. Thus, the text alone, stripped of contextual knowledge,
is an inadequate explication of exactly what types of conduct are actually
proscribed during interrogation. Rather, it is the text's interaction with a set of
temporally contingent understandings regarding inhumane treatment that
establishes where, on the spectrum of increasingly coercive techniques,
thresholds of impermissible pressure will be demarcated. It was within this
incipient legal context that the Cold War interrogation policies of the CIA and
military would develop.
B. Law and Interrogation: The Central Intelligence Agency
Perceptions concerning the saliency of the Soviet threat evolved from
feverish anxiety in 1949 to suspicious cooperation by 1972. At the end of World
War II the United States was "at the summit of the world. '' , 63 Americans, as
W. Averell Harriman noted, just wanted to "go to the movies and drink
Coke. ' '164 Yet, by 1947, anxiety about international communism had escalated
to near hysteria, and the Cold War had begun. 6, Washington feared that,
161. See RODLEY, supra note 143, at 75.
162. Id.
163. HAROLD EVANS, THE AMERICAN CENTURY 388 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
164. Evan Thomas, Sins of a Paranoid Age, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 27, 1993, at 20 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
165. See JAMES T. PATERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES, 1945-1974, at 83
(1996); JOHN RANELAGH, THE AGENCY: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE CIA 1O9 (1986);
FRANZ SCHURMANN, THE LOGIC OF WORLD POWER: AN INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINS,




unless contained, Russia would soon present America with a threat as great as
Nazi Germany. 6 6 Americans experienced a fear of communist subversion 16 , of
dimensions now difficult to understand. 68 The idea that international
communism must be contained bolstered a broad foreign policy consensus that




1. Coercion Within the Law
Fearful that an "interrogation gap" existed between the United States and
the Soviet Union-that the USSR as well as China had developed so-called
esoteric interrogation capabilities such as electroshock, hallucinogenic agents,
or truth serum drugs to force prisoners to divulge anything asked of them- the
CIA first investigated and then implemented chemical, biological, and other
human behavioral control methods for purposes of interrogation.1 70 An
individual involved with the program from its inception testified later that the
possibility that enemies "possessed capabilities in this field that we knew
nothing about.., seemed to us to pose a threat of the magnitude of national
survival.1 7' By 1951, though operational applications had started with some
frequency before,7 2 the CIA had sanctioned for use such special interrogation
166. See SCHURMANN, supra note 165, at 91.
167. See EVANS, supra note 163, at 399, 420.
168. See id. at 444.
169. See RICHARD A. MELANsON, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE THE VIETNAM WAR 17 (2005);
SCHURMANN, supra note 165, at 65, 105-o6; EUGENE R. WITTKOPF, FACES OF
INTERNATIONALISM: PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 191 (1992).
170. See Project MKUL TRA, the CIA's Program of Research in Behavioral Modification: Joint Hearing
Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence and the Subcomm. on Health and Scientific Research of
the S. Comm. on Human Resources, 9 5th Cong. 25 (1977) [hereinafter MKULTRA Hearing];
Human Drug Testing by the CIA, 1977: Hearings on S. 1983 Before the Subcomm. on Health and
Scientific Research of the S. Comm. on Human Resources, 9 5 th Cong. 207 (1977) [hereinafter
Human Drug Hearing]; Intelligence Activities - Unauthorized Storage of Toxic Agents: Hearings
Before the S. Select Comm. To Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities, 9 4 th Cong. 8 (1975) [hereinafter Church Committee Hearings]; S. REP. No. 94-
755, bk. 1, at 392-402 (1976) [hereinafter Church Committee Report]; REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT BY THE COMMISSION ON CIA ACTMTIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 226-28
(1975) [hereinafter ROCKEFELLER REPORT], available at http://www.history-
matters.conVarchive/church/rockcomn/contents.htm.
171. Human Drug Hearing, supra note 170, at 176.
172. See Memorandum for the Record from Cent. Intelligence Agency on Project ARTICHOKE
(Jan. 31, 1975) [hereinafter ARTICHOKE Memo], available at http://www.gwu.edu/
~nsarchivNSAEBB/NSAEBB54/sto2.pdf. The memorandum is also reprinted in ANDREW
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techniques as drugs (including LSD, barbiturates, and amphetamines) and
hypnosis. 173 The use of poorly understood chemicals was fraught with
unpredictability: bathrooms adjoining interrogation rooms in the field were
considered essential as the techniques used could induce nausea, vomiting, and
other dangerous reactions.' 74  Other special interrogation techniques
investigated included truth drugs (such as sodium pentothal), heat and cold,
atmospheric pressure, narco-hypnosis, and total isolation;17 s the use of "electric
methods" was authorized by 1963. 76 Classified Agency publications advocate
the use of temperature extremes, minimum sustenance, jostling without
physical harm, heavy physical exercise, and other "hostile methods that may
endanger the subject's mental and physical health." 77 The use of chemicals
during interrogations was authorized with varying levels of Agency approval at
least until the late 196OS.
7 8
Whatever legal concerns relating to the use of such techniques the CIA may
have entertained in the first decade of its interrogation program were almost
certainly mitigated not only by the extreme latitude of the law, but also by the
expectation of presidential pardon and support.179 Presidents Truman and
Eisenhower were exceptionally aggressive advocates of procedural freedom of
action for the CIA in the 1950S. President Truman reportedly provided Bedell
Smith, CIA director from 1950-1953, a blanket and undated presidential pardon
when concerns about legality began to trouble Smith.' A 1954 report on CIA
covert activities determined that "[h]itherto acceptable norms of human
conduct do not apply. If the United States is to survive, long-standing
GOLISZEK, IN THE NAME OF SCIENCE: A HISTORY OF SECRET PROGRAMS, MEDICAL RESEARCH,
AND HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION app. xi, at 355-57 (2003).
173. See Church Committee Report, supra note 170, at 387; ARTICHOKE Memo, supra note 172.
174. See RANELAGH, supra note 165, at 213 (quoting Memorandum from the Cent. Intelligence
Agency on "Artichoke," special comments (Nov. 26, 1951)).
175. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS (ACHRE), INTERIM
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HuMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS app. E (1994),
available at http ://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/radiation/dir/mstreet/interim/intret.txt;
ARTICHOKE Memo, supra note 172.
176. CIA, KUBARK, supra note 3, at 8.
177. Farndon, supra note 23, at 9, 27-28.
178. See ARTICHOKE Memo, supra note 172.
179. This fact, combined with scarce documentation of the legal rationales behind the
interrogation decisions of this period, might lead some to conclude that the CIA was acting
with complete disregard for, and not within, the law. This seems unlikely, however, as
variations of some of the same techniques remained authorized when later subjected to more
exacting (or, at least, demonstrable) legal scrutiny. See infra Subsection II.B.2.




American concepts of 'fair play' must be reconsidered. '1s The report was a
concise summary of President Eisenhower's views. '82 The security threat was
acute,"'s and absolution before the law almost total.
2. Ethics, Efficacy, and Legal Strictures
Three prominent concerns regarding propriety, comparative usefulness,
and legality began to emerge, however, as the urgency of the security threat
diminished by 1963 with the decline of the Sino-Soviet relationship 84 and the
warming of Soviet-American relations,' and as society's sensibilities evolved.
Moral and ethical considerations precipitated by the use of coercive
interrogation, not prominent during the' 1950S,186 began to trouble Agency
officials and interrogators by the early 196os. CIA reports in this period reflect
growing negative attitudes and moral objections among case-officers toward
the use of esoteric means of interrogation.' sT A 1963 CIA Inspector General's
report notes that many people found the manipulation of human behavior to
be "distasteful and unethical."' 88 Richard Helms, who served in the CIA for
twenty years before he became Director in 1966, noted that while maintaining
such capabilities presented a "moral problem," he had "no answer to the moral
181. REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY GROUP [DOOLITrLE COMMITEE] ON THE COVERT ACTITIES
OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (1954), reprinted in THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY: HISTORY AND DOCUMENTS 143, 144 (William M. Leary ed., 1984).
182. See STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, IKE'S SPIES: EISENHOWER AND THE ESPIONAGE ESTABLISHMENT
197, 198 (1981).
183. JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, STRATEGIES OF CONTAINMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF AMERICAN
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY DURING THE COLD WAR 157 (2005).
184. See ANDREW SINCLAIR, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 196 (1999).
185. See PATTERSON, supra note 165, at 508, 600.
186. See JOHN MARKS, THE SEARCH FOR THE "MANCHURIAN CANDIDATE": THE CIA AND MIND
CONTROL 31-32 (1979).
187. INSPECTOR GENERAL, REPORT OF INSPECTION OF MKULTRA/TSD (1963) [hereinafter
MKULTRA REPORT] (referencing a 196o study on the "Scientific and Technical Problems
in Covert Action Operations"), reprinted as redacted in Human-Use Experimentation Programs
of the Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Health of the S. Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare and the Subcomm. on Administrative
Practice and Procedure of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94 th Cong. 882, 900-01 (1975)
[hereinafter Human- Use Experimentation Hearings].
188. Memorandum from John S. Earman, Inspector Gen., Cent. Intelligence Agency, to Dir. of
Cent. Intelligence (July 26, 1963), in Human-Use Experimentation Hearings, supra note 187, at
879,88o.
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issue.' ', 8'  Nevertheless, such concerns did have an impact, and by 1963
interrogation policy promulgations expressed a "profound moral objection to
applying duress past the point of irreversible psychological damage."' 9°
Discomfort only grew as concerns became reflected more broadly in the
emerging group of new senior operations officers.' 9'
The development of new technologies with application to intelligence also
undermined support for the use of coercion by diminishing the comparative
efficiency of coercive interrogation and subverting its centrality to the
intelligence mission. 92  By the end of the 1950s, new intelligence
reconnaissance technologies were generating more accurate information than
had ever before been possible. 93 As technically acquired intelligence increased
in quantity and quality,194 the use of such esoteric aids as drugs for
interrogation, by comparison, began to seem like "high-risk, low-yield"
operations.1 95 The new methods of acquiring information were not only more
expedient tools for the collection of information concerning Soviet strategic
deployments, but they also represented relatively "antiseptic" and safer
intelligence practices. 96 The first years of the 1970s would provide an
indication of what would ultimately prove to be devastating by September 11,
2001: an Agency rich in intelligence analysis, but poor in human resources and
operations. 197
Notably, it was the concerns addressed- propriety and comparative
instrumentality- that appear to have animated resistance to the use of overtly
coercive methods of interrogation, not compelling scientific considerations
involving the inefficacy of coercion. While the CIA ultimately determined that
"no such magic brew as the popular notion of truth serum exists,"" s CIA
congressional testimony and inspector general reports also confirmed that
189. Church Committee Report, supra note 170, at 402.
19o. CIA, KUBARK, supra note 3, at 84.
191. See MARKS, supra note 186, at 204.
192. See Church Committee Report, supra note 170, at 117-18; MKULTRA Hearing, supra note
170, at 43.
193. See Church Committee Report, supra note 170, at 114; WILLIAM COLBY, HONORABLE MEN:
MY LIFE IN THE CIA 294, 295 (1978).
194. See Church Committee Report, supra note 170, at 26, 117.
195. MKULTRA REPORT, supra note 187, 23, reprinted in Human-Use Experimentation Hearings,
supra note 187, at 898.
196. Church Committee Report, supra note 170, at 26; COLBY, supra note 193, at 295; GROSE,
supra note 18o, at 396.
197. See Church Committee Report, supra note 170, at 120-25.




chemicals used during interrogation had made possible major operational
accomplishments199 and that narcotic relaxants like barbiturates could be
useful.200 Indeed, that no silver bullet existed-"no drug which [could] force
every informant to report all the information that he ha[d]" every time"'-
clearly did not present an unacceptable level of unpredictability as drugs
remained authorized as interrogation aids at least until the late 196os.2 °
The third source of concern was legality. Fears of legal consequences
arising from possible public disclosure of hostile methods of interrogation, not
salient during the 195os, had emerged by the early 196os, making the use of
coercion increasingly undesirable, and contributing to the ethical discomfort
and worries about comparative efficiency.2"' As explored, the strictures of the
law relating to foreign intelligence interrogations were both uncertain and
flexible. Indeed, with respect to such interrogations during peacetime -given
the absence of legally binding human rights law- the CIA was in theory able to
operate abroad without real fear of criminal sanctions.0 4 No federal law
criminalized torture or outlawed the perpetration of CID treatment outside the
United States. 0 And Supreme Court jurisprudence had not found the
Constitution, of itself, to confer rights upon aliens outside the sovereign
territory of the United States." 6
Despite the great latitude afforded by relevant law, concerns regarding legal
vulnerability began to materialize and are reflected in apprehension within the
Agency 0 7 and in the shape of interrogation policy itself. Prior to 1961, there
was little public scrutiny or criticism of the CIA. The abortive Bay of Pigs
invasion in 1961 was a turning point." 8 Public awareness of the Agency
increased, 0 9  and fears of possible legal repercussions became more
199. See MKULTRA REPORT, supra note 187, 21-23, 29, reprinted in Human-Use
Experimentation Hearings, supra note 187, at 897-98, 902.
200. MKULTRA Hearing, supra note 170, at 44.
201. CIA, KUBARK, supra note 3, at 99.
202. See ARTICHOKE Memo, supra note 172.
203. See CIA, KUBARK, supra note 3, at 2.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 144-145.
205. See infra text accompanying notes 269-271.
206. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (holding that when the United States acts against
civilian-citizens abroad, it must do so in conformity with the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to
the Constitution); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (195o).
207. See CIA, KUBARK, supra note 3, at 96.
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pronounced. By 1963, the CIA took special care to warn its agents that the use
of compulsion or duress during interrogation was especially likely to involve
illegality, and even the risk of later lawsuits. 20 Because of this reason, policy
now emphasized that coercion was not authorized for use at field discretion,
and required advance approval from the CIA director if bodily harm was
inflicted, or if medical or electrical methods or materials were used to induce
acquiescence.2"'
The use of drugs also became more tightly regulated. Prior to 1958, no
formalized policy process for the approval of drugs appears to have existed. 12
Instead it seems that drug use did not require high-level Agency approval and
was authorized permissively on an ad hoc basis. 3 Starting in 1958, the Agency
likely proscribed the use of drugs "where it may reasonably be expected to
cause the subject lasting mental or physical harm as contrasted to possible
temporary discomfort," and allowed the use of drugs only after certification by
the chief of operations that their use "is in the national interest."2 14 By 1967,
approval was required from a drug committee or from the deputy director of
plans-one more institutional rung up from the Chief of Operations-who
briefed the deputy director of Central Intelligence on the use of drugs at least
semiannually.1 In 1973, the use of drugs was apparently undertaken only with
the Director's approval.216
Most dramatically, an unprecedented new interrogation policy adopted in
1963 transparently sought to navigate more perfectly between permissible
coercion and coercion that might more plausibly transgress legal boundaries
210. See, e.g., CIA, KUBARK, supra note 3, at 8.
211. See id.
212. See Memorandum from Cent. Intelligence Agency to Chief of Medical Staff, Dir. of Sec.,
Chief of TSS, and Chief of Staff (Apr. 8, 1958) [hereinafter CIA Drugs Memo], in Human-
Use Experimentation Hearings, supra note 187, at 975-76; Memorandum from Richard Helms,
Acting Deputy Dir. of Plans, Cent. Intelligence Agency, to Deputy Chief of Staff, Cent.
Intelligence Agency (Mar. 14, 1958), in Human-Use Experimentation Hearings, supra note 187,
at 977.
213. See MKULTRA REPORT, supra note 187, at 9O1, 904; RANELAGH, supra note 165, at 212-13
(quoting Memorandum from the Cent. Intelligence Agency on "Artichoke," special
comments (Nov. 26, 1951)); ARTICHOKE Memo, supra note 172.
214. See CIA Drugs Memo, supra note 212, at 97S.
215. See ARTICHOKE Memo, supra note 172; Memorandum from Richard Helms, Deputy Dir.
of Plans, Cent. Intelligence Agency, to Dir. of Cent. Intelligence (June 9, 1964), in Human-
Use Experimentation Hearings, supra note 187, at 970-72.
216. See Memorandum from Cent. Intelligence Agency (Aug. 29, 1973), in Human-Use




and give rise to legal claims or sanctions." 7 The new CIA interrogation
paradigm emphasized reducing a source's psychological capacity to resist as
opposed to more facially severe measures designed to lower a source's
physiological resistance. It consisted chiefly of more subtle psychological
coercion techniques designed to disorient, and methods of indirect physical
pressure premised upon self-inflicted pain and discomfort. Under the new
policy, chemicals as interrogation aids were relegated to a support role.2"8 The
creation of debility through extreme deprivation was repudiated; rather, policy
emphasized inducing disorientation through disruption. The new approach to
psychological coercion relied upon isolation through solitary confinement, 19
the elimination of sensory stimuli, ° threats, relatively small degrees of
homeostatic derangement, and disruption and adjustment of regular patterns
such as sleep and food. 21 Policy counseled that indirect physical coercion such
as self-inflicted pain caused by stress positions like standing and enforced "for
long periods,,222 is available for "inducing regression of the personality to
whatever earlier and weaker level is required for the dissolution of resistance
and the inculcation of dependence."' 3 In its apparent repudiation of direct
physical pressures, and of chemicals as a principal means of psychological
coercion, the CIA had fashioned a policy more chary of existing legal strictures
while maintaining the freedom to apply degrees and methods of coercion as
severe as those apparently made available after September ii, 2001. The CIA
appears to have held a belief in the legality of this basic regime of physical and
psychological pressures (though at a reduced degree of coercion) at least until
1988. 224
Thus, despite the expansive legal latitude provided, flexible laws still
imposed an uncertainty too great to entirely forestall fears of accusations of
illegality, legal repercussions, and sanctions. These concerns, coupled with
moral qualms and intelligence advances in other fields, mitigated the
permissiveness of the law and the security climate, and prompted the design of
217. See CIA, KUBARK, supra note 3, at 6-9 (assessing legal restrictions on detention and
questioning).
218. See MKULTRA REPORT, supra note 187, reprinted in Human-Use Experimentation Hearings,
supra note 187, at 897-98.
219. See HARVEY M. WEINSTEIN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE CIA: VICrIMS OF MIND CONTROL 137
(1990).
220. CIA, KUBARK, supra note 3, at 86-92.
221. 'See id. at 86-87, 93.
222. Id. at 94.
223. Id. at 41.
224. See infra text accompanying notes 275-285.
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primarily psychological rather than physical mechanisms of coercion. While
ultimately accepting more limitations on coercion than the CIA adopted, the
general trajectory of the U.S. military's interrogation policy mirrors that of the
CIA.
C. Law and Interrogation: The Department of Defense
The armed forces, like the CIA, were fearful that sensitive security matters
could be unknowingly compromised by a hitherto unidentified truth serum,
and also explored and authorized the use of hallucinogenic and deliriant
compounds for interrogation.22 A 1959 Army report supporting a policy of
LSD use for interrogations overseas declared that "the stakes involved and the
interests of national security may permit a more tolerant interpretation of
moral-ethical values. ' '226 Particularly in the period 1958-1962, LSD was used as
an Army interrogation aid in Europe and the Far East.2 7 By April 1963, policy
procedures for the approval and use of drugs during interrogation had been
formalized to better regulate and limit their use.1
8
1. Coercion Within the Law
It is not clear, however, whether the use of narcotics as an interrogation
method by the military was considered legally available with respect to persons
protected by Geneva III or only for those not covered by, or whose status did
not entitle them to, prisoner of war protections. 29 What makes this a difficult
question is that military policy consistently23° -and still currently-has
25. See Human-Use Experimentation Hearings, supra note 187, at 150-52.
226. See UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE COMMAND STAFF STUDY, MATERIAL TESTING
PROGRAM EA 1729 (Oct. 15, 1959), as reprinted in MKULTRA Hearing, supra note 170, at 96
[hereinafter USAINTC STUDY].
227. See Church Committee Report, supra note 170, at 412; Human-Use Experimentation Hearings,
supra note 187, at 163.
228. See Church Committee Report, supra note 170, at 419-20.
229. See, e.g., Glod & Smith, supra note 155, at 154 (noting that in 1961, the Judge Advocate
General of the Army opined that the use of narcotics for interrogations of prisoners
protected by Geneva III would violate Articles 13 and 17 of the Convention). Note, however,
the article's acknowledgement of the "interpretational problems involved in deciding
whether a physical discomfort or scientific method can be used at any level of interrogation
without the commission of an illegal act." Id.
230. One exception exists. From 1987 to 1992, policy proscribed the use of drugs without any
caveat. See DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 34-52: INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION at 1-1
(May 1987) [hereinafter FM 34-52, 1987]; cf. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 34-52:
118:1434 2009
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declined to proscribe the use of all drugs for interrogations of protected
prisoners of war. Instead, policy construing and implementing the legal
restrictions on coercion imposed by Geneva III has carefully left the possibility
of some drug use open, only completely repudiating the use of "drugs that may
induce lasting and permanent mental alteration and damage."'231
Indeed, up until 1973, the military interpreted the legal limitations imposed
by Geneva III in an exceedingly narrow fashion. The prohibition of threats in
Article 17 of Geneva III was construed to nonetheless allow interrogators the
latitude to "use harsh and abusive language towards the subject and threaten
violence. 2 32 In 2002, such threats were considered of uncertain legality even for
use in interrogations of unlawful combatants - combatants not protected by the
law of Geneva III - and were not authorized as a policy matter.233 Rather,
discipline was recommended for interrogators who employed them. 34 Before
1973, however, the military did not consider such threats to constitute
impermissible coercion in the context of prisoner of war interrogations. But
neither were they perceived as nonaggressive: the "acute and painful" fear to
which they were thought to contribute was in some cases predicted to make an
interrogation subject "retreat to earlier developmental stages in his life-in
extreme cases, even to early childhood.21 3' Threats simply were not deemed
mental maltreatment of a severe enough nature to raise concerns of illegal
inhumane treatment under the Geneva Conventions.
Physical pressure more coercive by degree than any military interrogation
techniques authorized since 1973-post-9/11 included-was also made possible
by the flexible strictures of the Geneva Conventions. Standing, as a stress
INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION, at 1-8 (1992) [hereinafter FM 34-52, 1992], available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3 4 -52.pdf (prohibiting only the use of drugs that"may induce lasting and permanent mental alteration and damage").
231. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 30-15: INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION, at 4 (June 1, 1973)
[hereinafter FM 30-15, 1973]; DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 30-15: INTELLIGENCE
INTERROGATION, at 1-6 (Sept. 29, 1978) [hereinafter FM 30-15, 1978]; FM 34-52, 1992, supra
note 230, at 1-8 (1992); see FM 2-22.3, supra note 137, at 5-26.
232. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 30-15: INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATIONS 17 (1967)
[hereinafter FM 30-15, 1967]; see DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 30-15: INTELLIGENCE
INTERROGATION 2-6 (1969) [hereinafter FM 30-15, 1969].
233. A memorandum from the director of intelligence at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, sought
approval for convincing the detainee that "death or severely painful consequences" might
befall him or his family. Phifer Memo, supra note 6, at 228. The technique was not
recommended to the Secretary of Defense for approval, and the Secretary did not authorize
it. See Haynes Counter-Resistance Memo, supra note 6, at 237.
234. See SCHMIDT REPORT, supra note 6, at 24-26.
235. FM 30-15, 1967, supra note 232, at 21, 24; see FM 30-15, 1969, supra note 232, at 2-11, 2-13.
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position, was authorized for use on prisoners of war.236 Interrogation policy
promulgations advised interrogators that "[w]hen the subject refuses to
cooperate, the interrogator becomes very angry. He may order the subject to
stand at attention while being interrogated. '23 7 No time limit was placed on
this technique. An additional technique identified as "harassment" was
considered legally available and was authorized by policy before 1973. This
technique took several forms. Sleep deprivation without limitation was
included:
[a] subject may be called for interrogation at any time of the day or
night, questioned for a few minutes and then released only to be
recalled shortly thereafter. This treatment is continued until he realizes
that the harassment will continue until he talks, and he finally decides
to cooperate with the interrogator.23
8
Another form of acceptable psychological harassment-in the interrogation
parlance of the time-was total isolation.2 39 The extreme intrusiveness of
harassment in its various forms did not go unappreciated: policy counseled
opaquely but permissively that harassment should never reach the point of
physical torture. 4
These techniques, when authorized in 2002 for use by military
interrogators, were sanctioned in much more limited manifestations, and then
only for use on unlawful combatants not accorded the legal protections of
Geneva III - notably not for use on protected prisoners of war. Stress positions
like standing were authorized, but only for a period of four hours. Harassment
as sleep deprivation was authorized for military use, but its application was
limited to twenty hours a day. Harassment as an isolation technique was
236. FM 30-15, 1967, supra note 232, at 17; see FM 30-15, 1969, supra note 232, at 2-6.
237. FM 30-15, 1967, supra note 232, at 17; see FM 30-15, 1969, supra note 232, at 2-6.
238. FM 30-15, 1967, supra note 232, at 17; see FM 30-15, 1969, supra note 232, at 2-6.
239. See ARTICHOKE Memo, supra note 172, at 355. General techniques such as harassment that
are described in the Army field manual on interrogation are intended to provide a liberal
degree of creative latitude to interrogators. The manuals state this explicitly. See, e.g., FM
30-15, 1969, supra note 232, at 2-5. For a recent illustration of this practice of construction
(for example, the creation of a sense of "futility" through lap dances, use of culturally
offensive music, forced wearing of a bra, and the forced performance of dog tricks), see
SCHMIDT REPORT, supra note 6, at 9, 15, 19.
240. See FM 30-15, 1967, supra note 232, at 17; FM 30-15, 1969, supra note 232, at 2-6; see also C.N.
Geschwind, Counterintelligence Interrogation, STUD. INTELLIGENCE, Winter 1965, at 23, 33





limited to thirty days, with extensions made contingent upon high-level
approval."
2. Ethics, Efficacy, and Legal Strictures
Despite flexible legal authorities construed to provide great latitude, as
Cold War hostilities declined, "A' and as rights consciousness grew within the
United States, concerns about propriety and fears of possible legal
repercussions became more pressing. The use of drugs as interrogation aids
began to trouble policymakers. Prior permission from the Army Assistant Chief
of Staff for Intelligence- the primary Army officer responsible for
interrogation policy -for the use of drugs was mandated in part because of the
vexing legal and moral problems considered "inherent in their use."''" The
position taken by the Army-when authorizing the use of drugs as an
interrogation method- that "the stakes involved and the interests of national
security may permit a more tolerant interpretation of moral-ethical values," so
convincing to decisionmakers in 1959, was no longer as compelling by late
1963.' 4 As Cold War tensions abated, and uneasy d6tente"4S (and later even
cooperation"46) was pursued with the Soviets, the Army rescinded at least some
authorization of drug use." 7
The legal culture was also changing. In 1966 the U.N. General Assembly
adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
designed to imbed the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights in the legal obligations of states. Though the United States did not
ratify the treaty until 1992, by 1972 great support for further international
agreements addressing detainee treatment began to coalesce."48 Domestically,
241. See Haynes Counter-Resistance Memo, supra note 6, at 236, 237 (referencing the Phifer
Memo, supra note 6, at 227-28).
242. See PATTERSON, supra note 165, at 746.
243. Church Committee Report, supra note 170, at 419.
244. See USAINTC STUDY, supra note 226, at 96.
245. See PATTERSON, supra note 165, at 60o
246. See GADDIS, supra note 183, at 2o9.
247. See Church Committee Report, supra note 170, at 419.
248. See J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL,
INHUMANE OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 13, 33 (1988).
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rights-consciousness became central to the legal culture by 1970. 4' 9 This
extended to the protection of criminal defendants' rights. In a 1966 decision,
Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court expanded the privilege against self-
incrimination and found that statements provided by suspects to police during
custodial interrogation were inadmissible as trial evidence unless a prior
warning of rights had been given."
Of course, Geneva's language had allowed a narrow reading of the
Convention's restrictions. Domestic law also did not address interrogation
where admissibility of evidence at trial was irrelevant, and provided little
direction for how limits on foreign intelligence interrogations should be
understood. (Miranda had only established a trial right, not law applicable to
all types of interrogation- much less intelligence interrogations of aliens in
foreign territory.) Nonetheless, the legal milieu had become such that the
military was now increasingly cautious and sensitive to allegations of possible
illegality. Media scrutiny, which had begun in 1964, gave life to accusations of
inhumane prisoner of war treatment."' The conflict in Vietnam, inspiring
division, doubt, and a loss of public confidence in the capacity of
government," 2 exacerbated these concerns as further accounts of brutality
emerged."s3  By 1972, the armed forces were demoralized5 4  and, in
unprecedented fashion, vulnerable to attack in the press and the courts.5  In
1972, at the high water mark of d6tente-the atmosphere of tentative
cooperation now a far-cry from the profound apprehension and paranoia of the
late-194os and 195os2 6 -the Army rescinded approval of the use of threats,
stress positions, sleep deprivation, and total isolation as interrogation
techniques. This would not change until 2002.
Despite apparent indications to the contrary, concerns about efficacy do not
appear to have contributed to the growing anxiety over the use of coercion
249. BERNARD BAILYN ET AL., THE GREAT REPUBLIC: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 1225
(1977) [hereinafter THE GREAT REPUBLIC]; PATTERSON, supra note 165, at 638.
250. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
25. See Howard S. Levie, Maltreatment of Prisoners of War in Vietnam, in 2 THE VIETNAM WAR
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 361,376 (Richard A. Falk ed., 1969).
252. See PATTERSON, supra note 165, at 600.
2S3. See EvANs, supra note 163, at 559; THE GREAT REPUBLIC, supra note 249, at 1231; PATTERSON,
supra note 165, at 756.
254. See EvANs, supra note 163, at 522.
255. See DALE ANDRADE, ASHES TO AHES: THE PHOENIX PROGRAM AND THE VIETNAM WAR 212
(1990).
256. See THE GREAT REPUBLIC, supra note 249, at 112o; SCHURMANN, supra note 165, at 1OO;
Thomas, supra note 164 at 20.
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generated by legal uncertainty and ethical considerations. A 1963 field manual
establishing protocol for the use of drugs in interrogation notes
incongruously-given the manual's inclusion of an order condoning the use of
drugs as an interrogation method- that "[m]edical research has established
that information obtained through the use of these drugs is unreliable and
invalid."" 7  Similar statements maintaining the inefficacy of violent
interrogation measures appeared first in the 1967 Army Field Manual and then
in every subsequent edition of the interrogation manual.2s s A variant of this
assertion was included in the most recent field manual.25 9 Such declarations
that the use of force constitutes an ineffective method of obtaining accurate
information-and military studies purporting to show the same26,- were first
made at a time when most American POW returnees from Korea and Vietnam
admitted to succumbing to the use of physical coercion during interrogation. 
61
In short, the claims did not reflect the empirical record or even accumulated
experience. Rather, they appear to have been a necessary outgrowth of a
military training and education program seeking to remedy deficiencies in
American servicemen's ability to resist enemy interrogation through
indoctrination of the American soldier in the belief that he could deny
information and resist enemy interrogation even under pressure. 
6
,
Thus, over the course of the 196os and early 197os, as legal and ethical
concerns grew in prominence, policy limits on the use of coercion gradually
tightened, serving as protection against accusations of illegal treatment and the
anxiety induced by the vexing moral imponderables occasioned through
authorization of rough interrogation techniques.
III.AVOIDANCE: INTERROGATION BY OTHERS, 1973 TO 2001
Interrogation by proxy characterizes U.S. interrogation policy from 1973
until 20Ol. During this period, the most intractable legal questions and explicit
257. Church Committee Report, supra note 170, at 419.
258. See FM 30-15, 1967, supra note 232, at 5; FM 30-15, 1969, supra note 232, at 1-3; FM 30-15,
1973, supra note 231, at 4; FM 30-15, 1978, supra note 231, at 1-6; FM 34-52, 1987, supra note
230, at 1-1; FM 34-52, 1992, supra note 230, at 1-8.
259. See FM 2-22.3, supra note 137, at 5-21.
a6o. See ALBERT D. BIDERMAN, COMMUNIST TECHNIQUES OF COERCIVE INTERROGATION 5, 20 (Air
Force Personnel & Training Research Ctr., Development Report No. AFPTRC-TN- 56-1 32,
1956).
261. See VERNON E. DAVIS, THE LONG ROAD HOME: U.S. PRISONER OF WAR POLICY AND
PLANNING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 543 (2000).
262. See id. at 18, 20-27.
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ethical qualms were ultimately avoided through the almost total cession of
interrogation responsibilities to non-American personnel. This program,
primarily a CIA effort, first involved advice and training-mostly independent
of direct participation in interrogations263 -provided to intelligence
counterparts of allied foreign governments. Participation in foreign
interrogations became even more attenuated during the subsequent-and
lasting-permutation of the program, wherein the United States would
provide the intelligence and logistical assistance necessary to detain a source of
interest, and then benefit from whatever information was acquired from the
subject by the cooperating foreign government. Each stage of this policy
countenanced the indirect use of tactics that U.S. intelligence interrogators
were by then forbidden to employ themselves.
A. Coercion and the Law
In the little under three decades prior to 2001, despite the great ambiguity
of the law, the types of concerns that led the CIA and military to ultimately
resist certain forms and degrees of coercion by 1973, and after 9/11, were
exacerbated. These concerns, especially regarding retroactive discipline, were
aggravated by intense and unprecedented public scrutiny, continuing
developments in international human rights law, and a more entrenched
institutional ethic of opposition to the use of coercion. Congressional
investigations of CIA and DoD wrongdoing produced the most comprehensive
public accounting of intelligence activities to date. The perception of the CIA as
a "rogue elephant" contributed to the eventual imposition of greater restraints
and regulations on Agency prerogative through enhanced oversight and
reporting requirements.264 The CIA's clandestine service was purged, and the
human intelligence gathering capabilities of the now timid directorate of
operations severely degraded. 6  The trend toward satellite and electronic
technologies accelerated at the expense of human operations, 66 "Technical
secrets" intelligence, while certainly efficacious, presented a most welcome
minimalist alternative: the intelligence services could remain informed about
263. See CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, HUMAN RESOURCE EXPLOITATION TRAINING MANUAL -
1983, slide B-17, at B-4 (1983) [hereinafter CIA EXPLOITATION MANUAL], available at
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB122/#southcom.
264. JOHN PRADOS, PRESIDENTS' SECRET WARS: CIA AND PENTAGON COVERT OPERATIONS FROM
WORLD WAR II THROUGH THE PERSIAN GULF 347 (1996).
265. See RANELAGH, supra note 165, at 644-45.




the rest of the world in a way that was comparatively safe and clean.267 Though
during the 198os the CIA would regain some of its diminished morale and
operational capability, scrutiny of the Agency did not diminish and
apprehension regarding adverse publicity and legal action remained and grew
more pronounced.268
International human rights law also was changing. CAT was drafted in a
process that began in 1977 and ended in 1984 with its adoption by the U.N.
General Assembly. CAT entered into force on June 26, 1987, and was signed
and ratified by the United States in 1990.269 The documents were deposited to
the United Nations in 1994 whereby the United States committed to
implement measures to prevent torture, and assumed a lesser treaty obligation
to "undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of
cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount
to torture. 2 70 CAT, unlike any predecessor international declarations such as
the UDHR, sought to define torture and thereby inject greater legal clarity
about what was proscribed. The Convention, like the later Torture Statute that
in large part incorporated its language, nevertheless leaves many of its central
terms undefined. As discussed previously, "severe pain" is provided no
meaning. The phrase "cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment" was left
uncertain and without an accepted definition."z Still, notwithstanding the
indeterminate and contestable nature of the proposed legal regime, by 1977 an
effort to establish a more exact legal definition of torture began in a forum with
direct potential relevance to U.S. law, hinting at a future containing greater
legal accountability and the possibility of eventual penal sanctions.
A basic resistance to employing coercive methods of interrogation also
persisted. CIA memoranda from the 198os and 199os declare, for example, that
"[a]side from the legal and policy considerations that are constant in any
allegation concerning violations of human rights, we also must recognize a
basic moral obligation. We are Americans and we must reflect American values
267. See RANELAGH, supra note 165, at 654, 655; WOODWARD, supra note 266, at 24.
268. See FREDERICK P. HITz, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION: SELECTED ISSUES RELATING TO CIA
ACTIVITIES IN HONDURAS IN THE 198OS, at 18-19 (1997) [hereinafter CIA HONDURAS
REPORT]; JOHN RANELAGH, CIA: A HISTORY 221 (1992); RANELAGH, supra note 165, at 655.
269. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51
(Dec. 1o, 1984) [hereinafter CAT]; BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 248, at 31, 107.
270. CAT, supra note 269, art. 16.
271. See INGELSE, supra note 145, at 207.
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in the conduct of our business."272 Still, this vision was circumscribed: it was
not universal in scope, seemingly concerned with and including only those
actions of the Agency itself.273 Indeed, the Agency was exceedingly less
principled with respect to facilitating and benefiting from intelligence acquired
through the less restrictive practices of others. 74 While the Agency itself may
have deplored certain levels of pressure, an essential hypocrisy characterized its
moral calculus.
The interrogation policy limits for CIA officers ultimately imposed by 1973
were largely maintained thereafter, but the degree of coercion thought legally
available appears to have been restricted. At least until 1988,75 the CIA
interpreted the law to allow stress positions ("rigid positions such as standing
at attention or sitting on a stool for long periods of time"1276), disrupted
sleep, 77 solitary confinement,7 8 sensory deprivation,279 threats of violence,
examination of body cavities,28 1 and temperature manipulation. 8, Perhaps in
light of the more nuanced legal definition of torture discussed as early as 1977
for ultimate inclusion in the CAT, by 1984, if not earlier, the CIA appears to
have understood the strictures of the law to limit the severity of the coercion
that could be applied through these techniques. The techniques considered did
not change; only the degree of pressure applied was curtailed. Now prolonged
solitary confinement and the creation of unbearable stress through extreme
272. CIA HONDURAS REPORT, supra note 268, at 18; see also Introduction-I.B, in CIA EXPLOITATION
MANUAL, supra note 263, at A-i; Introduction-I.C, in CIA EXPLOITATION MANUAL, supra note
263, at A-2.
273. See infra text accompanying notes 286-298.
274. Id.
275. See McCoy, supra note 20, at 97-98.
276. CIA EXPLOITATION MANUAL, supra note 263, slide L-12, at K-io. The edits of July 1984 were
made in conformity with the newly attached "Prohibition Against the Use of Force"
affirming that the "use of force, mental torture, threats, insults, or exposure to unpleasant
and inhumane treatment of any kind as an aid to interrogation is prohibited by law, both
international and domestic; it is neither authorized nor condoned." Id. at A-o.
277. See id. slide L-3, at K-1 to K-2; id. slide L-17, at K-14 to K-15.
278. See Checklist for the "Questioning"-IV.K, in CIA EXPLOITATION MANUAL, supra note 263, at L-
4; CIA EXPLOITATION MANUAL, supra note 263, slide L-io, at K-6 to K-7; id. slides F-5 to F-
18, at F-2 to F-4.
279. See id. slide L-1o, at K-6 to K-7; id. slides E-24 to E-36, at E-3 to E-5.
280. See id. slide L-I, at K-8 to K-9; id. slide 1-22, at 1-8; id. slide K-7, at J-6 to J-7.
281. See id. slide F-14, at F-3.




deprivation of sensory stimuli were considered prohibited by law.283
Self-inflicted discomfort was substituted for pain, and stress positions were
limited to periods of time not long enough to cause physical damage.2s4
Applying duress beyond the point of irreversible psychological damage was
proscribed and viewed as illegal. 8s Yet the simplest solution to avoid difficult
legal questions and explicit ethical qualms was the almost total cession of
interrogation responsibilities to others. So the CIA and military pursued
interrogation by proxy, which, though it had the potential to provoke anxiety
over moral concerns and future claims of illegality, presented a cleaner and
more risk-averse alternative to interrogations conducted directly by U.S.
personnel.
B. Coercion by Proxy
By 198o, at a time of growing alarm, the United States turned to
interrogation by proxy.28 6 "[D]6tente was dead [and] buried. ''2s7 This second
major escalation of the Cold War was as tense as any moment since the early
1960S. ss Much of the most heated conflict of this second phase of the Cold
War unfolded in Central America, where the United States resisted what it saw
as widespread communist subversion. Here, at points throughout the 198os,
U.S. advisors counseled allied foreign intelligence services in methods of
coercion that at times exceeded the level of coercion deemed permissible when
considered for use by U.S. personnel. The CIA instructed in the use of threats
of violence, self-inflicted pain, disorientation through sleep and dietary
manipulation, and sensory deprivation -all without the limits and caveats that
were imposed when the basic legality of American use of these techniques was
assessed. 89 Military training manuals and program materials condoned
283. See id. slide L-io, at K-6 to K-7.
284. See id. slide L-i2, at K-9 to K-it.
z85. See id. slide L-6, at K-3.
286. See GADDIS, supra note 183, at 349.
287. Id.
288. JAMES T. PATrERSON, RESTLESS GIANT: THE UNITED STATES FROM WATERGATE TO BUSH V.
GORE 110 (2005).
289. See CIA EXPLOITATION MANUAL, supra note 263, slides E-25 to E-36, at E-3 to E-5; id. slides
F-5 to F-18, at F-2 to F-4; id. slide 1-22, at 1-8; id. slides L-3 to L-17, at K-1 to K-15; id. slide
K-7, at J-6 to J-7. These citations refer to the CIA Exploitation Manual as it was originally
published (before the July 1984 amendments). Since these amendments were made by
hand, the 1983 edition cited here presents both versions.
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physical abuse and beatings as interrogation methods when employed by
foreigners.290
The program was not without risk. As the United States and the Soviet
Union moved toward unprecedented accommodation,2 9 ' and as congressional
and media scrutiny of the CIA's role in training foreign intelligence services
grew, 92 the training program was eventually discontinued. 93 By 1991, the
military also had discontinued the use of foreign training materials and
programs that condoned coercion deemed impermissible for use by American
soldiers. 94
The challenges presented by terrorism, however, would breathe new life
into a lasting iteration of the interrogation by proxy program. The new
program was extraordinary rendition. As has been documented extensively
elsewhere, 9 ' it involved the apprehension and transfer abroad-outside the
established system of legal extradition-of individuals wanted for crimes,
sometimes for purposes of interrogation. Starting in 1995, the rendition of
terrorists from one state to another quickly became routine activity.,96 The
Agency would assist with logistical support in the detention and transfer, and
290. See JAMES HODGE & LINDA COOPER, DISTURBING THE PEACE: THE STORY OF FATHER RoY
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USSOUTHCOM%20CI%2oTraining%20(U).pdf; Memorandum from Werner E. Michel,
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Training Manuals to the Sec'y of Def. (Mar. 10, 1992) [hereinafter Michel Memo], available
at http ://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB122/920310%2OImporper%2O
Material%20in%20Spanish-Language%20Intelligence%2oTraining%2oManuals.pdf; Latin
American Working Group, Declassified Army and CIA Manuals Used in Latin America: An
Analysis of Their Content, http://www.lawg.org/misc/index.php?option=com-
content&task=view&id=319&Itemid=65 (last visited Feb. 13, 2009).
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294. See Michel Memo, supra note 290.
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then, in the words of the CIA inspector general from 1990 to 1998, "use the
fruits"'2 97 of interrogations conducted by foreign services-such as the




This Note has shown that in times of national insecurity since World War
II, the law has been interpreted to permit the authorization of highly coercive
interrogation methods. The current debate over interrogation law and policy is
not served by the erroneous historical framework to which even the opposing
parties to this debate have subscribed, namely, that a dramatic break with the
past occurred in the aftermath of 2001. Interrogation's law- absolute bans on
vaguely defined abuse-has provided the latitude that has, in turn, permitted
the authorization of coercive interrogation since World War II. To declare that
the law's mandates were clear before 9/11,299 but grossly misconstrued- even
repudiated-in its aftermath, and that if only properly acknowledged will be
clear yet again, is to delegate the tough questions in future interrogation
dramas to the executive branch agencies discussed in this Note. This Note has
shown how, prior to 9/11, responsible officials who wished to obey the law's
uncertain boundaries found sufficient latitude to authorize highly coercive
interrogation techniques. In light of the past, there is little reason to expect
different practices in times of future fear. If this is troubling, then a rethinking
of interrogation law and policy is necessary.
297. Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations; 'Stress and
Duress' Tactics Used on Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret Overseas Facilities, WASH. POST, Dec.
26, 2002, atAi.
298. See Mayer, supra note 1o; Scheuer Interview, supra note 34.
299. See, e.g., Jane Mayer, A Deadly Interrogation: Can the C.LA. Legally Kill a Prisoner?, Nrw
YORKER, Nov. 14, 2005, at 44, 51 ("I think the world was very simple before 9/11. We knew
what the law was .... Now there's real uncertainty." (quoting Sen. Richard Durbin)).
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